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LEGAL THEORY
PROVING THE LAW
Gary Lawson*
Interpretative theory has become a major growth industry over the
past two decades. Legal academics in particular have invested heavily in
the enterprise, producing a burgeoning literature that addresses many of
the most important problems of legal interpretation.1 The discussion to
date, however, has largely neglected one critical aspect of interpretative
theory: the selection of appropriate standards of proof for legal propositions. That neglect will not bother or surprise interpretative skeptics
who doubt the utility of searching for "true" or "better" meanings of
texts, but it ought to prove troubling to any theorist who wants to make
absolute or comparative claims about legal meaning.
The extant writings on interpretation-or at least that portion of
them which accepts the possibility of better and worse readings of legal
texts2-are concerned essentially with identifying the nature and significance of the factors that bear on the determination of a text's meaning.
An adequate theory of interpretation, however, must also specify the total weight or magnitude of evidence needed to establish the meaning of a
given text in a given context. Stated simply, it does no good to have a
methodology for interpreting a text unless one also knows when it is time
to declare epistemological victory or defeat and move on. Yet the problem of identifying the appropriate level of evidentiary weight-that
is, the appropriate standard of proof-for resolving questions of law
seems to have gone unaddressed in the ongoing debate over legal
3
interpretation.
* Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980 Claremont Men's
College, J.D. 1983, Yale Law School. I have benefitted from, though have often unwisely ignored,
the advice and criticism of many people, most notably Ronald J. Allen, Akhil Reed Amar, Steven G.
Calabresi, George C. Christie, Anthony D'Amato, Stephen T. Davis, John Harrison, David Kelley,
Michael S. Moore, Michael J. Perry, John Earle Strong, and Peter Tillers. I am grateful to the
William M. Trumbull Fund for support and to my student editor for a truly heroic performance.
1 Those problems range from the philosophically foundational (what does it mean, in either a
private or public sense, to interpret a legal text?) to the highly concrete (what is the appropriate role
of legislative history in statutory interpretation?).
2 Discussions of legal meaning understandably tend to focus on the interpretation of written
texts. I therefore do as well, though all forms of interpretation, such as the interpretation of dreams
or social structures, must also deal with the problem of standards of proof.
3 At least, I have not seen any extensive discussions of this problem, and people far better read
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This gap in the scholarship on interpretative theory reflects a similar
gap in the administration of the American legal system. It is conventional to distinguish between propositions of law and propositions of fact.
Our legal system has an elaborate set of standards for determining, or at
least expressing, the magnitude of the evidence needed to justify propositions of fact, but there is by and large no equivalent set of explicit standards for determining or expressing the magnitude of the evidence
needed to justify propositions of law. Moreover, the legal system's failure systematically to consider the problem of the appropriate standard(s)
of proof for propositions of law is only one of a number of important
asymmetries in its treatment of legal and factual questions. An exploration of the bases and possible justifications for these asymmetries can
yield valuable insights into the operation of, and alternatives to, our
methods of adjudication.
This Essay has three distinct tasks. In Part I, I establish that the
problem of standards of proof in interpretation cannot be ignored. First,
I contend that all positive legal propositions are, in one distinctive but
significant sense, factual propositions. Second, after a brief definitional
detour, I examine the structure of proof used by the law for the justification of conventionally labelled propositions of fact and show that the
selection of a standard of proof is an essential part of that structure.
Third, I argue that the law's formal structure for the proof of facts is
applicable to all factual claims in all legal or nonlegal contexts. Finally, I
complete the syllogism by arguing that the problem of standards of proof
must therefore be fundamental to the justification of propositions of law.
While this discussion focuses on legal interpretation, it can be generalized to all cognitive endeavors in all disciplines. Accordingly, my aim in
Part I is to raise issues concerning standards of proof at a very high level
of abstraction, not to investigate concrete problems of legal theory.
In Part II, I examine some of the limited contexts in which the
American legal system has explicitly dealt with the problem of standards
of proof in legal interpretation, and I argue for self-conscious consideration of the problem in all contexts. I have little to say, however, about
how that problem should be resolved. The answer is inescapably normative, depending heavily on the end one seeks to serve through interpretation.4 This inescapable normativity has two important consequences.
First, it demonstrates that law and morality cannot fully be separated: at
least one element of any form of legal reasoning-the selection of a standard of proof-necessarily implicates normative concerns. Second, it
means that very different standards of proof may be required for interthan I-in the disciplines of law, literature, and philosophy-assure me that I have not missed anything obvious. Nonetheless, I apologize in advance to the many people whose work I have no doubt
overlooked.
4 Cf. Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 359
(1988) ("Interpretation is like architecture, in this important respect: form must follow function.").
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pretation in scholarship and in adjudication: the standards appropriate
for legal scholars may be entirely inappropriate for lawyers or judges.
In Part III, I explore some theoretical and practical implications of
viewing law as something which must be proved in a legal proceeding
like any ordinary fact. The discussion will reveal that this notion is not
as revolutionary as it might seem, 5 as questions of foreign law were for
several centuries, and are still to some extent, treated for many purposes
like questions of fact by Anglo-American courts. I suggest that this way
of thinking about questions of law, both foreign and domestic, can produce less disruption and more salutary benefits than might appear at first
glance.
Many of the thoughts expressed in this Essay are only partially
formed, and much of the time I am addressing, with a brevity that borders on the irresponsible, subjects well beyond my depth. My aim is simply to provoke consideration and discussion of certain ways of thinking
about the law that appear to have been neglected (perhaps, it will turn
out, for very good reasons) in modern debates on interpretation. I do not
claim to have sound answers or hard theses, but I do think I have useful
questions.
I.

THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF PROOF

Suppose someone tells you that A has broken B's window. If you
are a typical person, you might respond by insisting that A's accuser
"prove it"-especially if you happen to be A. Conversations of this kind
ordinarily presuppose that claims like "A has broken B's window" are
either true or false and that identifiable considerations can, at least in
principle, bear on their truth or falsity. A demand for proof of such
claims seems eminently meaningful and reasonable.
Now suppose you are told that A has broken B's law. Here too, if
you are a typical person, it seems easy to imagine demanding proof of the
claim, again on the assumptions that it is either true or false and that
identifiable considerations can, at least in principle, bear on its truth or
falsity. Indeed, a typical person might opine that the very purpose of
legal proceedings is to provide a formalized vehicle for exhibiting, and to
some extent defining and confining, such proof, so of course it is meaningful and reasonable to insist that A's accuser prove his claim.
Legally or philosophically minded people, however, are likely to
raise a host of decidedly atypical objections to either or both of these
5 Peter Tillers, The Value ofEvidence in Law, 39 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 167, 167 (1988) (predicting
that many people will find talk about proving the law "unconventional, and possibly even startling").
Professor Tillers is one of the few scholars explicitly to note the parallel between proof of facts and
proof of law. See Peter Tillers, Introduction, 66 B.U. L. REv. 381, 382 (1986). See also NORMAN J.
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.13 (5th ed. 1992) ("Just as evidence is
needed in order to decide an issue of fact ....

so also is evidence needed in order to reach an

informed judgment as to what a legislature 'intended' or what a statute 'means.' ").
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hypothetical conversations, ranging from broad-based skepticism about
the meaning or utility of words in general, to broad-based skepticism
about the meaning or utility of specific words like "truth" and "falsity,"
to more particularized skepticism about the use of words like "truth"
and "falsity" in connection with claims about the law, to even more particularized doubts about the relevance of concepts like "proof" to every
aspect of legal claims.
My focus here is on this last, modest kind of skepticism. Such a
skeptic could, without questioning the meaning or utility of talk about
truth in connection with the law, 6 say that claims concerning the breaking of laws are, in their susceptibility to proof, categorically different
from claims concerning the breaking of windows. To the extent that
claims of the first kind implicate claims of the second kind, the argument
might run, they are subject to what people ordinarily think of as proofbut only to that extent. Claims about the law or the meaning of legal
texts, the skeptic might conclude, contain an element of nonfactual judgment and normativity that renders them insusceptible to "proof" as the
law knows it.
My suggestion in this Essay is that there are more epistemological
parallels between "A broke B's window" and "A broke B's law" than
one might think at first glance, and that recognizing those parallels does
not entail commitment to wildly implausible theories of law. On the contrary, the existence and extent of those parallels is largely independent of
one's view of the nature, sources, and efficacy of law, as is therefore the
significance of the problem of standards of proof in legal interpretation.
Before addressing that problem, however, it is necessary to lay some
groundwork about the nature of legal claims and legal truth.
A.

Is That a Fact?

The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is
deeply ingrained in American jurisprudence-in our practices and traditions, 7 our statutes, 8 and even the federal constitution. 9 While the law6 Which is not to say that it is beyond question. See, eg., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 198 (1990) ("to ask whether 'it is true' that the Fourteenth Amend-

ment means this or that has an odd ring."). It seems clear, however, that one who does accept the
utility of such talk would accept as well the utility of factual truth-talk and of language in general.
7 See CHRISTOPHER F.
TROL OF BUREAUCRACY

EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CON-

29 (1990); Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Au-

thority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels:,A Unified View of the Scope of Review, The Judge!
Jury Question, and ProceduralDiscretion, 64 N.C. L. REV.993, 993-94 (1986).
8 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1988) ("The findings of the Commission with respect to questions
of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclu-

sive.") (emphasis added); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) ("In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or
with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of
law thereon.").
9 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
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fact distinction is sometimes criticized as confusing and unhelpful, 10
there are good reasons for its enduring character: it provides a serviceable, if not indispensable, tool for allocating decisionmaking authority in
a complex, layered legal system. But its critics are correct on at least one
point: the law-fact distinction, whatever its utility, is purely a creature of
convention. From an epistemological perspective, every positive propositional claim about the law in the form "the law is X" is a factual claim of
one sort or another.'1 Of course, (conventionally defined) propositions of
law and fact may describe different kinds of facts, whose discovery might
require somewhat different modes of inquiry, but that does not alter their
epistemological equivalence as descriptive claims about some feature of
the physical, mental, or moral world.
Because the suggestion that propositions of law can be equated in
any way with propositions of fact may call to mind theories of law that
often provoke bemused laughter in sophisticated circles, it is important
to emphasize the suggestion's narrow scope. It is a statement about propositions, not a statement about law. One does not commit to any particular theory of law by acknowledging the epistemological equivalence of
factual and legal propositions-apart from the theory that statements
about law can indeed be propositions. 12 Specifically, one does not commit to the positivist or formalist views that law can exist or be identified
without reference to normative considerations, that any specific materials
constitute authoritative sources of law, or that law is to any particular
degree determinate or constraining on decisionmakers. These views all
concern the metaphysicalcontent or nature of law, not the epistemological
status of (positive)legalpropositions. Whatever one's metaphysical theory
of law may be, any positive propositions derived from that theory are,
from an epistemological standpoint, claims of fact.
To illustrate just how innocent this point is, imagine a jurisprudential theory which holds that "law" cannot be defined without reference to
the actual or predicted conduct of Judge J, that Judge J's decisions are
guided entirely by her perception of what would be morally good outcomes on the basis of all-things-considered decisionmaking, and that the
only reason any sane person would talk about "law" at all is to try to
figure out how to avoid Judge J's gallows. This theory of law certainly
exceed twenty dollars, the right oftrial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to -the rules of the
common law.") (emphasis added).
10 See EDLEY, supra note 7, at 72-105. Much of the criticism concerns the difficulty of classifying so-called "mixed" questions of law and fact, such as whether the defendant's conduct in a particular case constituted negligence. When I speak of questions of law in this Essay, I generally mean
pure, abstract questions of law which everyone would agree fall on the "law" side of the conventional
law-fact dichotomy. See infra note 68.
11 Cf. Tillers, The Value of Evidence in Law, supra note 5, at 168-69 (suggesting the factual
character of questions of law).
12 See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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does not presuppose the kind of positivism or formalism that might be
associated with the view that propositions of law are a species of propositions of fact. Nonetheless, any propositions of the form "the law is X"
that are advanced in light of this theory are propositions of fact.
To see this point, consider the two principal ways in which an adherent of this kind of hard-core legal realism might make statements of
that form. First, after Judge J has rendered her decision in a dispute
between A and B, one might say that Judge J's decision "is" the "law"
applicable to that particular dispute. Indeed, one might even say that
there is nothing that can be called "law" until Judge J has spoken. That
view quite plainly reduces positive propositions about the law to propositions of fact-namely, descriptive propositions about A, B, and Judge J's
13
decision.
Second, the hard-core legal realist might also make claims couched
in the form of predictions of Judge J's actions. That is, before Judge J
actually decides a dispute, the "law" applicable to (on this account it
would be a category mistake to say "governing") 14 that dispute might be
said to consist of a probability distribution for Judge J's expected conduct,1 5 which would presumably be derived from estimations of how
Judge J would normatively assess the dispute in question. Any positive
claims about that probability distribution, and hence about the law,
would then be factual claims of the form "the law is X."
Now consider the theory that law consists not (or not only) of actions but also of certain materials or considerations, so that there exists
some set of principles external to Judge J called "law," to which Judge
J's actions can conform or fail to conform. Positive propositions about
those principles-about that "law"-will be statements of fact, regardless of those principles' sources or character. The point is obviously true
of statements made by legal positivists who define "law" in terms of some
set of social facts, but it is true as well of propositions advanced by legal
naturalists who insist upon a connection between law and morality. 16 A
legal naturalist who is a moral realist-that is, who believes that moral
13 For example, a statement like "A's actions with respect to B broke the law" would amount to
"Judge J has issued certain orders with respect to A and B." After Judge J's decision is rendered,
the statement can factually be seen to be either true or false. If made before Judge J's decision is
rendered, it would be factually false.
14 See POSNER, supra note 6, at 225.
15 More precisely, it would likely consist of a set of probability distributions reflecting different
assumptions about such things as world events, lawyerly identity and competence, and anything else
that could affect Judge J's all-things-considered normative assessment of the case. See ANTHONY
D'AMATo, JURISPRUDENCE: A DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW 20, 33 (1984)

[hereinafter D'AMATO, JURISPRUDENCE]; Anthony D'Amato, PragmaticIndeterminacy, 85 Nw. U.

L. REV. 148, 181, 186 n.129 (1990) [hereinafter D'Amato, PragmaticIndeterminacy].
16 1 am here using positivism to describe the view that law and morality are conceptually distinct, and naturalism to describe the view that norms cannot truly be legal unless they have some
moral grounding. For a more subtle and careful definition of legal positivism, see JULES L. COLEMAN, Negative and Positive Positivism, in MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 3 (1988).
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propositions can be judged true or false by reference to standards other
than human convention-would of course happily agree that propositions of law are factual statements notwithstanding their normative component, 17 but even nonrealist natural lawyers must concede it as well,
provided that they are moral cognitivists.18 The realism/nonrealism debate in ethics concerns whether or not moral concepts refer to entities or
relations that exist independently of human conventions. Because the
existence vel non of particular conventions is a fact, nonrealist-but-cognitivist natural lawyers must view positive legal propositions as factual.
The present analysis, however, does not apply to legal naturalists
who endorse noncognitivism in ethics-that is, who do not believe that
ethical statements can be either true or false. If "the law is X" is inherently normative, and if all normative statements are commands or emotive utterances, then a statement like "the law is X" will mean something
like "do X" or "please do X," and hence will not be factual. 19 But then
we are no longer talking about positive legal propositions,since a proposi20
tion by definition is the sort of statement that can be either true or false.
Thus, if all statements of law are necessarily nonpropositional, they cannot be treated as factual assertions.
Finally, to say that propositions of law are factual is not necessarily
to subscribe to the view that all legal questions have single right answers
rather than a range of permissible answers. 21 A proposition of the form
"the law is X," where X is a range of outcomes, is still a statement of
fact.
I have gone on at length because this point is foundational, not because it is complicated. If one makes any propositional claims about
what the law is, regardless of what one has in mind by "law," one is
making claims of fact. The facts involved may be of a different sort and
discoverable through different methods than facts about the molecular
structure of DNA, but they are facts nonetheless. Accordingly, if there
is a set of universally applicable epistemological standards for the justifi17 See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Metaphysics, Epistemology and Legal Theory, 60 S. CAL. L. REv.
453, 480 (1987) ("For a [moral] realist, an answer is right when it corresponds to a complex moral
fact.") (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985)).

18 A moral cognitivist is anyone who believes that moral statements can be true or false, regardless of how that truth or falsity is established. See Raziel Abelson & Kai Nielsen, History of Ethics,
in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 81, 106 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).

19 See Vincent A. Wellman, PracticalReasoningand JudicialJustification.:Toward an Adequate
Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 45, 75-76, 108-09 (1985).

20 At least, that is what the word "proposition" means in my lexicon. Others may use the term
differently. See Boruch A. Brody, Glossary ofLogical Terms, in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-

PHY 57, 72 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) ("There is no uniform use of the word 'proposition' among
logicians and philosophers.").
21 See generally POSNER, supra note 6, at 197-203 (discussing and criticizing the right-answer

thesis in legal and literary contexts).
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cation of factual truth claims, at least a prima facie case exists for applying those standards to the justification of positive propositions of law.
B. Interlude: What Is Truth (In Twenty-Five Words or Less)?
Throughout this discussion, it is important to keep clear the distinctions between truth and justification and between existence and one's
knowledge of existence.22 More fundamentally, before one throws
around terms like "proof," "truth," and "justification," one should specify, as best as one can, what it means for a proposition to be true and for
a truth claim to be proved or justified-in the law or otherwise.
The bedrock, or metaphysical, conception of truth is correspondence with a reality that exists independently of its acknowledgement by
the conscious mind of a perceiver; and a (metaphysical) truth claim is
warranted or justified when it identifies some feature of that reality beyond a rational doubt. 23 There is often utility, however, in employing
narrower, more specialized senses of truth and justification, provided
that one never loses sight of those terms' bedrock meanings.
The meaning of legal justification is straightforward: a proposition is
legally justified when the evidence for the proposition that is admitted
and evaluated pursuant to the law's evidentiary principles satisfies the
law's applicable standard of proof (which, as I shall later show, might be
considerably more generous than the beyond-a-rational-doubt standard
appropriate for metaphysical truth claims). 24 Of course, the evidentiary
22 See Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41
STAN. L. REV. 871, 874-78 (1989).
23 This definition of truth assumes away some of humanity's most long-lived and fundamental
philosophical questions, while the definition of a warranted truth claim includes a rather bald and illdefined assertion of an appropriate standard of proof. I apologize for the second definition, but not
for the first.
The correspondence theory of truth that I take for granted, see generally Moore, supra note 17,
at 455, reflects a metaphysical view at least as old as Aristotle that Ayn Rand aptly termed the
primacy of existence: reality exists independently of its acknowledgment by any conscious mind, and
the cognitive function of consciousness is to perceive this preexisting reality, not to create its own
objects of knowledge. See AYN RAND, The Metaphysical Versus the Man-Made, in PHILOSOPHY:
WHO NEEDS IT? 23 (1982). The primacy of existence is axiomatic, meaning that it is implicitly
presupposed by any attempt to question, deny, or justify it. Accordingly, it is not subject to proof,
because it is an antecedent foundation for all modes of proof. Like all axioms, the primacy of existence can be exhibited as axiomatic, but no other form of validation is possible or necessary. See
DAVID KELLEY, THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES: A REALIST THEORY OF PERCEPTION 27-43
(1986) (discussing the nature and methods of validation of the primacy of existence). In view of the
primacy of existence, coherence theories of truth, see Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 283, 330-31 (1989), can supplement but not supplant correspondence theories. See Michael S.
Moore, A NaturalLaw Theory of Interpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 312 (1985).
The failure to give a useful account or defense of the beyond-a-rational-doubt standard for
metaphysical truth claims is less excusable. I can only plead that an adequate account would require
a book which I am unequipped to write, and that the usefulness of my questions does not always
depend on the persuasiveness or completeness of my answers.
24 It is always a question of metaphysical truth whether a conclusion is legally justified given
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principles that are supposed to guide legal decisionmakers, such as privileges and other admissibility rules, are rife with normative considerations
that are often utterly perverse from the standpoint of metaphysical truthfinding. 25 Thus, legal justification can be a function of conformance with
artificial legal rules and underlying normative judgments rather than
with standards that are appropriate for the discovery of metaphysical
truth. The claim that "A broke B's window" might be justified in some
without regard to whether it
legal systems and unjustified in others-all
26
is metaphysically true or justified.
Legal truth, on the other hand, is a highly equivocal term. It could
refer to the metaphysical truth of propositions thought to lie on the
"law" side of the law-fact dichotomy, such as "A broke B's law." Alternatively, it could simply be a way of describing the state of being legally
justified, in which case it is applicable to claims of either law or fact. A
proposition is legally true in this latter sense if it is justified in light of
whatever method one has for justifying legal claims.
This Essay is concerned exclusively with legal justification, and
hence with legal truth in the second sense described above. 2 7 Accordingly, when I refer to legal truths, I mean propositions that are justified
by reference to the law's internally prescribed epistemological standards,
whatever those may be. The question of how to give a metaphysical account of legal truth, and in particular what it would mean to say that an
interpretative proposition of the form "this text means X" is metaphysically true, is a matter for another day.
C. The Structure of FactualProof
We can now begin in earnest an exploration of some of the problems
involved in the proof of positive legal propositions. Positive propositions
about the law are a species of factual claims. Accordingly, in thinking
about how one might justify them, it is useful to examine the process of
proving or justifying an unambiguously factual assertion that could be
put forward in a legal proceeding: "At some point on June 15, 1991, I
was sitting at my word processor." Our legal system structures the justificatory inquiry for factual claims of this kind to address three different,
though potentially overlapping, epistemological problems, which I call
particular evidentiary standards and a specific evidence set. But it can be (known to be) metaphysically true that a proposition satisfies certain standards without the proposition itself being (known to

be) metaphysically true.
25 See POSNER, supra note 6, at 205-06.
26 Legal justification is thus purely formal: it says nothing about how one might select the relevant evidentiary principles, and it says nothing about the normative significance, if any, of legal
conclusions that are "justified" in this manner.
27 An intriguing article by Professor Lipkin insists that the law can and should dispense altogether with the concept of truth, as "justification is all we ever have or need." Robert Justin Lipkin,
Indeterminacy, Justificationand Truth in Constitutional Theory, 60 FORDHAM L. REviEw 595, 625
(1992). I do not agree with Professor Lipkin, but that dispute is best pursued elsewhere.
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the problem of admissibility,the problem of significance, and the problem
of weight or magnitude. Some answer to each of these problems is (epistemo)logically necessary to the rational formation of any conclusion, including the conclusion "I don't know," as they conjointly determine the
criteria for warranted assertions of truth. Moreover, the law's method
for proving factual propositions is often supplemented by the allocation
of burdens of proof, which dictate the result that governs whenever the
relevant principles of admissibility, significance, and magnitude yield "I
don't know" as the justified answer.
The first problem faced by a theory of justification is to determine
which considerations are permitted to count for or against the legal truth
of the proposition in question. This is the function of rules of admissibility. 2 8 In our legal system, a decisionmaker considering whether to accept
or reject a factual proposition is in theory permitted to take account of
only a subset of the myriad facts in the world. 29 Some such limitation is
unavoidable, if only as a concession to the shortness of life and the scarcity of resources, though the content of the admissibility rules will depend upon the extent to which the legal system pursues ends other than
the ascertainment of metaphysical truth, such as the giving of normative
guidance to decisionmakers in the face of metaphysical uncertainty.
Once one has identified the admissible evidence, one must then establish the level of significance to which that evidence is entitled.30 This
significance can in theory be measured either cardinally or ordinally, depending upon whether a unitary numerical scale exists upon which evidence can be weighed. 31 In any case, some means for assigning
significance to the admissible evidence must be operative, even if those
means are tacit, automatized, or unspecifiable.
Interestingly, while our legal system has explicit (though perhaps
highly elastic and even vacuous) rules for establishing admissibility, it
imposes almost no formal structure on the decisionmaker's significanceassigning process. The fact finder is simply supposed to give the admissi28 See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 402 (relevant evidence is generally admissible); FED. R. EvID. 404
(evidence of a defendant's character or past crimes is admissible only for limited, enumerated purposes); FED. R. EVID. 407 (evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not admissible to prove
culpability); FED. R. EVID. 802 (hearsay is generally not admissible).
29 The extent to which the rules of admissibility actually constrain decisions-or function as
rules rather than standards-is irrelevant to this inquiry. My only point here is that our legal system
takes explicit account of the epistemological problem of admissibility. Whether and how it solves
that problem is another matter altogether.
30 The significance of a particular item of evidence may always be a function of the total evidence
set of which it is a part, so that it is impossible to discuss the significance of a single piece of evidence
out of context. For my purposes, it does not matter whether the proper objects of inquiry are individual bits of evidence or sets of (admissible) evidence taken as wholes.
31 My own view is that, apart from repeatable events that can be modelled in terms of mathematical probability, judgments of significance are essentially relative or ordinal, but this point is not
critical to my argument. See generally Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of JuridicalProof,13 CARDOZO
L. REv. 373, 376-82 (1991). But see infra note 37.
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ble evidence its due, and review of that determination takes place on a
gestalt basis, asking essentially whether the fact finder evaluated the evidence rationally. 32 Crucially, however, the absence of explicit structure.
for the significance-assigning process does not mean that the legal system
is unaware of the need for such a process. By its silence, the law adopts
by default whatever significance-assigning processes its prescribed fact
finders choose to employ. But that adoption is expressly qualified by the
availability of review, at both the trial and appellate level, of the rationality of the fact finders' assignment of significance. In addition, Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 specifies that evidence which is otherwise admissible can be excluded if its probative value is "substantially outweighed"
by various other considerations. 33 Although this is formally a rule of
admissibility and not of significance,3 4 it is grounded in assumptions
about the treatment that various pieces of evidence are likely to receive in
a significance-assigning process, and it specifically calls upon judges to
make some assessment of "probative value." Thus, there is explicit recognition within the legal system that there are at least some standards,
however inarticulable,
that can and must be applied to the significance35
assigning process.
Finally, and critically, when the admissible evidence has been identified and evaluated, one needs to know how (metaphorically) heavy the
pile must be in order to justify a legal truth claim. For any given proposition in any given context, one needs a standardof proof that expresses
the total weight or magnitude of the evidence required for a justified assertion of that proposition. On a cardinal scale of measurement, one can
express the standard numerically in terms of probability: a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard would call for probability greater than 50
percent, a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard would call for
probability greater than 50 plus N percent, etc. 36 On an ordinal scale,
the boundaries of such "standards," if they exist, must be marked by
32 Perhaps this is because the process of assigning significance to evidence does not lend itself to
a rule-based approach, as the (ordinal) significance of items of evidence is highly context-dependent.
Cf. Allen, supranote 31, at 413 ("There is no precise algorithm available to explain to jurors, or for
that matter to historians, anthropologists, or astrophysicists, how to connect evidence to organizing

theories.").
33 FED. R. EvID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded ifits probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.").
34 The distinction between admissibility and significance breaks down at the edges: it is hard to
see a difference between saying that something is inadmissible and saying that it is entitled to no
significance whatsoever.
35 Legal scholars are also acutely aware of the significance problem, if one can judge by the
quantity of literature on the subject. See, e.g., Symposium, Probability and Inference in the Law of
Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REv. 377 (1986). Unfortunately, quantity may be the only measure available to
laypersons such as myself; I find most of this literature wholly inaccessible.
36 See United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 402-06 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (assigning cardinal

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

exemplars expressed in terms of warranted certainty rather than
probability. For example, one could say that the evidence for a proposition satisfies an ordinal clear-and-convincing-evidence standard if it renders the claim as or more certain than some other, representative claim
which seems correct but nonetheless might leave room for reasonable
disagreement. 37 In any event, some standard of proof-whether cardinal
or ordinal, explicit or implicit-must be operative, or no conclusion, including "I don't know," can rationally be advanced.
When facts are at issue, our legal system clearly recognizes this need
for standards of proof. In criminal cases, relevant factual propositions
generally must be established by the prosecution "beyond a reasonable
doubt"; in civil cases, the asserting party generally must establish them
by a "preponderance of the evidence"; and in certain other contexts different standards such as "clear and convincing evidence" are prescribed. 38 I am aware of no instance in our legal system in which a
proposition of fact must be proved but no standard of proof is acknowledged to be necessary. The prescribed standard, of course, affects the
justifiability of legal truth claims in obvious ways: evidence that may be
sufficient to warrant a legal truth claim when the standard of proof is
"preponderance of the evidence" may not be sufficient to warrant the
same claim when the standard is "beyond a reasonable doubt," even
when the available evidence sets and the governing principles of admissibility and significance are identical. 39
probabilities to a variety of proof standards), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1073 (1980).
37 This is a departure from a strictly ordinal account of knowledge, since it postulates some
basis, external to a system of pure rank ordering, for declaring certain propositions to be exemplary.
It also assumes (as David Kelley has pointed out to me) that the degree of certainty that is warranted
for different propositions, as opposed to the degree of certainty that is warranted for the same proposition by different evidence sets, can in fact be placed on a single ordinal scale. I am confident that
both assumptions are correct, but I do not know how to demonstrate or give a full account of them.
I suspect that concepts describing degrees of warranted certainty can only be defined ostensively-by
illustration rather than by verbal expression. A fuller exploration of this critical point, however,
should be left to professional philosophers.
38 See, eg., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (1991) (noting that publicfigure libel plaintiffs cannot recover unless they prove "by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant published the defamatory statement with actual malice"); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852-53 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of a state requirement that an incompetent person's alleged wish to terminate medical treatment be demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that
"[b]efore a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child,
due process requires that the State support its allegations [of parental neglect] by at least clear and
convincing evidence"); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979) (holding that civil commitment proceedings require a standard of proof at least as demanding as a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard). Of course, an entirely different set of standards governs appellate review of factfinding.
39 The utility, or even meaningfulness, of the law's prescribed standards is not important here.
See William Twining, The Boston Symposium: A Comment, 66 B.U. L. REV. 391, 392 (1986). The
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Indeed, if a standard of proof is sufficiently strict, it may be the case
that neither a particular proposition nor its negation can satisfy it. One
can imagine, for example, not being justifiably convinced beyond a reasonable doubt either that a meteor strike did contribute to the extinction
of the dinosaurs or that it did not. If the legal truth or falsity of either
proposition is important, one must have some means for dealing with this
kind of uncertainty. The standard legal device is the allocation of burdens of proof. Whenever the fact finder is not satisfied that the available
evidence meets the threshold for either truth or falsity with respect to a
relevant proposition, leaving "I don't know" as the epistemologically appropriate answer, the law imposes the burden of that uncertainty upon
someone, enabling the fact finder to render a decision in the case without
necessarily fixing the legal truth value of the claim. Thus, when facts are
at issue, the law specifies the requisite standards of proof and also
prescribes a rule of decision for the zone of uncertainty in which those
standards preclude a definitive true-or-false answer.
D. The Universalizabilityof the Law's Proof-of-FactStructure
This three-part inquiry into admissibility, significance, and magnitude prescribed by the law for the proof of propositions of fact may not
be the only way of structuring a theory of justification. But it is an extremely powerful and useful way. One can imagine a legal system providing any number of different solutions to the problems of admissibility,
significance, and magnitude, but it is difficult to imagine a legal system
that does not provide some solution.
Indeed, it is difficult-and I will even say impossible-to imagine
any rational system of inquiry within any subject area that does not attempt to provide answers to the law's threefold questions of admissibility, significance, and magnitude. Any person purporting to make a
warranted truth claim of any sort, in the context of a legal discussion or
otherwise, must be prepared to answer each of these questions: what did
you count, or not count, as evidence of truth or falsity; how heavily did
you count it; and how much evidence, and of what quality, did you require before making your claim?
The universalizability of the legal system's structure for the proof of
facts can be nicely illustrated by applying that structure to Rene
Descartes' famous contention that the difficulty of distinguishing vivid
dreams from real perceptions (or of ruling out the possibility that evil
demons are deceiving us) broadly casts doubt on most, if not all, of our
knowledge claims.40 It bears emphasis that the point of this illustration
important point is that the legal system is conscious of the problem of standards of proof with
respect to questions of fact and explicitly attempts, however unhelpfully, to resolve it.
40 See Rene Descartes, Meditations on the FirstPhilosophy, in THE RATIONALISTS 112-17 (John
Veich trans., Anchor Books 1974) (1641) (wondering, in view of the possibility of vivid dreams and
deceitful demons, whether and how he could know that he was sitting at his fireside when he clearly
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is simply to demonstrate, in a nonlegal context involving the most mundane of propositions, the general utility of the law's three-part structure
for the proof of facts. The point is not to evaluate the Cartesian argument or otherwise to address foundational questions of epistemology.
As I compose these words, I believe that I am sitting at my word
processor. But do I know that I am doing so? After all, dreams are often
quite vivid, generating images that at the time seem indistinguishable
from actual sensory perceptions. Thus, isn't it possible that I am now
dreaming that I am sitting at my word processor, or that an evil demon is
inducing me falsely to believe that I am sitting there?
The problem of justifying (as a metaphysical truth claim) the proposition "I am sitting at my word processor," and by extension any factual
proposition, can profitably be analyzed in terms of the three-part inquiry
sketched above: what considerations count for or against the truth of the
proposition, how significantly do those considerations count, and when
are enough considerations amassed so that epistemological victory or defeat can finally be declared?
Consider first the answer to the problem of magnitude implicit in
the Cartesian argument. In support of my claim to be sitting at my word
processor, I can offer a wealth of sensory evidence too varied to recount.4 1 The asserted objection to my knowledge claim is the possibility
that I am dreaming, or that an evil demon is deceiving me, or that my
sense data is for some other reason nonveridical. There is no contextspecific evidence to suggest that I am mistaken; there is only the conceivable possibility of deceitful demons or of vivid dreams that sometimes
seem like actual perception. The Cartesian argument therefore might be
asserting that a knowledge claim is justified only when it is supported by
evidence so weighty that the possibility of error is literally beyond imagination. The appropriate magnitude level-that is, the prescribed standard of proof-would thus be proof "beyond a conceivable doubt."4 2
Accordingly, an opponent of Cartesian skepticism might argue that the
prescribed standard of proof is inappropriate for particular knowledge
claims or for knowledge claims generally. 43
thought he was doing so). For a modem extension of Descartes' reflections, see BARRY STROUD,
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SCEPTICISM (1984). See also BRUCE AUNE, KNOWLEDGE

OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD (1991) (surveying many of the arguments for and against this Cartesian
skepticism).
41 This makes assumptions about the admissibility and significance of sensory evidence, which
are explored and defended at length in KELLEY, supra note 23.
42 See A. J. AYER, THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 35 (1956) ("The [skeptic's] attack is directed, not against the way in which we apply our standards of proof, but against these standards
themselves."); Robert J. Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalismand the New Fuzziness: The
Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 822 (1990) ("For
radical skeptics, the possibility that a statement can be doubted renders that statement unreliable,
and therefore precludes it from being a legitimate claim to knowledge.").
43 The Cartesian standard, one could say, excludes the possibility of any knowledge, including
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Alternatively, the Cartesian skeptic might adopt a lesser standard of
proof (perhaps "beyond a rational doubt") while maintaining that the
ability to imagine error, especially in view of our frequent experience of
error, bears powerfully enough on whether I am in fact mistaken in this
particular case to prevent my knowledge claim from meeting the applicable standard of proof. Stated thusly, the argument implicates considerations of significanceas profoundly as it does considerations of magnitude.
And a critic of Cartesian skepticism could therefore respond along this
dimension, insisting that too much significance has been given to the generalized possibility of error, even if the standard of proof employed by
the Cartesian skeptic is appropriate.44
Finally, the Cartesian skeptical argument, especially in its demonic
incarnation, raises issues of admissibility. What evidence do we have in
favor of the thesis that an evil demon might be affecting my mind? We
have none, or at least none that is worthy of attention.4 5 One could well
maintain as an epistemological matter that considerations unsupported
by evidence (or by evidence worthy of attention) cannot themselves be
evidence for or against any proposition. On this reasoning, the unsupported assertion that evil demons might be controlling my mind is simply
inadmissible in a serious cognitive endeavor. Indeed, it does not even
qualify as an assertion-no more than would a random collection of
knowledge that two plus three equals five. While I cannot directly imagine being wrong about that
proposition, I can imagine being in a state of mind in which I am committing errors that I cannot at
the time imagine committing. I can therefore imagine that my inability to imagine being wrong is
not decisive as to whether I can know that two plus three equals five. See Descartes,supra note 40,
at 115. But no theory that excludes the possibility of any such knowledge can be taken seriously,
because of the familiar problems of self-reference: it would preclude at least some of the knowledge
necessary to formulate the Cartesian argument itself.
44 See GEORGE H. SMrrH, ATHEISM: THE CASE AGAINST GOD 132-36 (1979); Leonard Peikoff,
"Maybe You're Wrong," THE OBJECTIViST FORUM, Apr. 1981, at 8. The ability to imagine error,
the response runs, proves nothing about whether one is in fact in error, or even capable of error, in
any given case; it proves only the extent of one's imagination. Nor does the ability to imagine error
acquire a new status when joined with past instances of error. The fact that one has erred before
(perhaps one has wrongly taken a dream to be an experience of reality) may be grounds for investigating whether one is erring in this particular instance. But once that investigation has turned up a
blank, revealing no context-specific evidence suggesting error and overwhelming context-specific evidence suggesting a veridical experience, there is no epistemological warrant for an assertion that
"you might be wrong." That assertion has already been given its due by the conducting of an investigation into the possibility of error in this case. One could challenge the adequacy of that investigation, but the challenge will make sense only if one identifies some specific flaw in the investigation; a
generalized claim that "investigations are sometimes wrong" is no reason to doubt the efficacy of this
particular investigation if there are affirmative reasons to believe in its adequacy.
45 Here again, considerations of admissibility and significance tend to merge at the margins. See
supra note 34. One could insist that the ability to imagine the existence of demons is some, even if
very unpersuasive, evidence of the actual possibility. Or, for that matter, one could assert that the
inability of the Cubs to win the World Series constitutes evidence of demons-lousy evidence, perhaps, but evidence nonetheless. There is no effective difference between saying that this "evidence"
is entitled to no significance and saying that it is simply inadmissible, though the shortness of life
may counsel in favor of the latter formulation.
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stones that somehow assumed the shape "demons rule." 4 6
Again, my point here is not to argue for or against Cartesian skepticism. Indeed, one could perform a similar exercise using any proposition
drawn from any discipline. Rather, my point is to suggest, using the
most mundane proposition imaginable ("I am presently sitting at my
word processor"), that the law's three-part treatment of proof of facts
seems to reflect something very deep and all-pervasive about knowledge
claims. The problems of admissibility, significance, and magnitude are
problems that need to be addressed, directly or indirectly, by philosophers, literary theorists, engineers, and Cubs fans wondering when the
next home game is scheduled. 47 People who make positive claims about
the law need to address these problems as well.
E. Legal Interpretationand the Structure of Proof
It is useful to compare the legal system's treatment of factual propositions with the treatment that the legal system and interpretative theorists generally afford propositions of (domestic) law. It is safe to say
that everyone is aware at some level of the need to address the problems
of admissibility and significance. Indeed, that is precisely what most debates over statutory or constitutional interpretation are all about (though
they are typically not couched in the language of evidence): what considerations count as evidence of the meaning of a legal text, such as a provision of the federal constitution, and how important is that evidence? Do
we consult, and with what degree of interest, indicators of public meaning at the time of ratification, evidence of the intentions of the drafters,
contemporary usages, evolving moral traditions, modem polling data,
the current political platform of the Democratic Party, etc.? Any person
who applies any interpretative theory necessarily answers these questions, even if only tacitly. Thus, at a minimum, a theory of interpretation
serves the same function in assessing the legal truth of propositions of
law as principles of admissibility and significance serve in assessing the
legal truth of propositions of fact.
But if that is all that a particular theory of interpretation does, it is
radically incomplete and indeterminate. As noted above, any knowledge
claim about a proposition, including a claim of ignorance or agnosticism,
46 See Leonard Peikoff, Reason, Emotion, and the Arbitrary (pt. 2), THE OBJECTIVIST FORUM,
Dec. 1987, at 1-2. Or, more generally, one could argue that someone who denies or questions the
validity of sense perception cannot make use of any concepts that depend upon it. This amounts to a
claim that universal, noncontextual doubts about the veridical nature of perception are inadmissible
as a class, because the veridical character of perception is axiomatic. See KELLEY, supra note 23, at

29-43. Cf.Moore, supra note 23, at 332-38 (employing a similar argument against skepticism).
47 This does not mean that every decisionmaker must consciously go through this process before
reaching any conclusion; the principles guiding the process are usually automatized. But if one is
seeking to give an explicit, self-conscious warrant for a conclusion, that warrant will necessarily

implicate these three elements.
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presupposes not only principles of admissibility and significance, but also
some governing standard of proof. If one is making claims about the
meaning of a legal text, one must know what counts as evidence of the
text's meaning, how significant that evidence is, and when "enough" evidence has been gathered to warrant a legal truth claim about the text's
meaning. All three elements are indispensable.
The choice of a standard of proof, with principles of admissibility
and significance held constant, can obviously affect interpretative outcomes with respect to questions of law, just as it can with respect to
questions of fact. Imagine, for example, that one has agreed (perhaps
after threats of violence) that the federal constitution should be interpreted in accordance with originalist textualism, understood as a method
which searches for the ordinary public meanings that the Constitution's
words, read in linguistic, structural, and historical context, had at the
time of those words' origin.48 This method specifies the sort of evidence
that is admissible for determining the meaning of a particular text (anything that bears on the text's original public meaning) and a principle,
albeit not a very helpful one, for judging the significance of that evidence
(how much does it bear on public meaning?). But without the specification of a standard of proof, the theory is useless. If the interpretative task
is simply to discover whether a particular conclusion is better than its
available alternatives, where "better" is a function of the interpretative
theory's principles of admissibility and significance, then one could readily conclude (to take an example that is unlikely to ignite passions) that
Congress cannot create judicial offices in federal territories whose holders
do not have tenure during good behavior or guarantees against diminishment in salary while in office. 49 But if one must reach a conclusion beyond any glimmer of doubt whatsoever, the answer to that question
becomes indeterminate,50 as does the answer
to virtually all interesting
51
questions of constitutional interpretation.
The need for standards of proof and the effect of standards of proof
on interpretative outcomes are independent of the admissibility and significance rules of one's theory of interpretation. Even if your theory of
interpretation is, "The constitution (or any other text) means whatever
48 See Gary Lawson, In Praise of Woodenness, 11 GEo. MASON U. L. REv., 21, 22 (Winter
1988).
49 See Gary Lawson, TerritorialGovernments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CAL. L. REv.
853, 878-93 (1990).
50 One could argue, as did Chief Justice Marshall in American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of
Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828), that the adjudication of cases in territories is not an exercise
of "the judicial Power of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The argument is, to say the
least, unpersuasive, but it is not an act of lunacy.
51 Indeterminacy in interpretation, however, need not be indeterminacy in adjudication. One
can decide a case without deciding which interpretations are legally true or false, simply by determining who has the burden of proof. If the applicable interpretative theory yields no determinate
answer, the party with the burden of proof loses. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
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my favorite moral theory says is a good idea," you must have some standard of proof that specifies how sure you must be that X isin fact what
yourfavorite moral theory prescribesbefore you can justifiably claim legal
truth for an interpretation. If the proper standard of proof is proof beyond any glimmer of doubt whatsoever, is there really a plausible moral
theory anywhere that can satisfy that standard with respect to propositions specific enough to resolve most legal disputes? 52 Thus, my analysis
concerns the formal character of truth claims about legal texts, not the
substantive merits of particular theories of interpretation.
Because the availability of interpretative answers is sensitive to the
standard of proof that one employs, the standard of proof problem may
be of interest to at least some of the participants in the ongoing debate
over legal indeterminacy-the debate over the extent to which legal theories53 can yield single right answers or identifiable ranges of right answers
to legal questions. 54 The likelihood that one will be able to justify a particular proposition about the law, and thus obtain a right answer as defined by one's theory, is directly proportional to the looseness of one's
standard of proof: a beyond-a-conceivable-doubt standard will render
any legal theory wholly indeterminate, while a beyond-a-rational-doubt
standard will put a pretty good dent in most of them. A theory's determinacy thus depends not merely on the extent to which principles of
admissibility and significance intelligibly tell you what to look for and
how to evaluate it, but also on how much evidence is necessary to justify
52 Lest I be misunderstood, this is not an assertion of moral skepticism. Indeed, I am a strong
believer in both moral reality and justifiable knowledge of that reality. But if moral propositions
must be established beyond any glimmer of doubt, then the most that could be known would be
certain principles of exceedingly broad generality (such as "promote your own distinctive excellence
as a person"); one could almost never know the proper application of those principles to concrete
situations.
53 By "legal theory" I mean any theory that purports to provide a means for justifying positive
legal propositions. I do not mean to limit the nature of those propositions. In particular, a legal
theory need not be a descriptive or predictive account of the actual behavior of legal actors. One
could, for instance, believe that there is "law" out there to be discovered, but remain highly skeptical
of the likelihood of any particular legal actor actually discovering it. One could believe that the
relevant source of law is not words on pages but rather the behavior of people, or even thoughts in
the mind of God. Or one could believe that there is no "out there," and that law consists entirely of
predictions. As long as these beliefs generate positive claims about law, they are all legal theories.
54 See Kress, supra note 23, at 320 (defining indeterminacy). I have not read most of the indeterminacy debate, and I will not cite works that I have not read. So, with no assurance that these works
are truly representative of the debate, see, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain
Any JudicialDecision, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV.513 (1989); Anthony D'Amato, Can LegislaturesConstrain JudicialInterpretationofStatutes?, 75 VA. L. REV.561 (1989); D'Amato, PragmaticIndeterminacy, supra note 16; Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773
(1987); Stanley Fish, Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and Literature, 97
YALE L.J. 777 (1988); Ken Kress, A Preface to EpistemologicalIndeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv.
134 (1990); Kress, supra note 23; Lipkin, supra note 42; Moore, supra note 23; Frederick Schauer,
Easy Cases, 58 S.CAL. L. REv. 399 (1985); Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory,
42 STAN. L. REv.639 (1990).
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an answer. Rational debate on determinacy-like rational debate on any
subject whatsoever-cannot take place without reference to55 standards of
proof. The problem is fundamental, and it is inescapable.
II.

STANDARDS OF PROOF IN THE LAW

The American legal system does not specify an appropriate standard
of proof (or allocation of the burden of proof) for every proposition of
law that arises in adjudication, as it does for propositions of fact. The
absence of such specification, however, does not mean that no standard
of proof is operative. Indeed, to the extent that statements of law are
propositional in nature, some standard must always be operative,
whether or not it is acknowledged by decisionmakers or scholars.
The obvious explanation for the law's failure to address this problem
systematically is that the law does not, in general, view legal propositions
as objects of proof in the same way that it views factual propositions as
objects of proof. In Part III, I examine the consequences of this view and
discuss how our system of adjudication could, and to a very limited extent does, function on the opposite assumption. In the remainder of Part
II, I aim simply to identify the discrete areas in which the law explicitly
provides a standard of proof for questions of law and the considerations
that seem to guide the law's choices. Doing so isolates the gaps in the
law's epistemology and provides insights into the kinds of questions that
decisionmakers and scholars must answer in order to close those gaps.
A.

Some Realism About Standards

Before examining how judges and legislators have approached the
problem of standards of proof for legal propositions, it is useful to inquire
how lawyers and clients seeking to avoid legal entanglements would approach the problem and, more importantly, how they would not approach it.
Consider how philosophers on the one hand and practical lawyers
on the other would likely react to the suggestion that the appropriate
standard of proof for legal propositions is proof beyond a conceivable
doubt (as at least one interpretation of Cartesian skepticism suggests is
55 My discussion has confined itself to situations in which an interpretative theory's principles of
admissibility and significance are taken as given. The more familiar problems of interpretative theory, of course, are deciding upon the appropriate principles of admissibility and significance or determining the applicability of given principles to particular evidence sets. As I have demonstrated, the
standard of proof problem is independent of these substantive disputes about interpretation. This
gives rise to a modest puzzle. Because every interpretative theory, regardless of content, needs a
standard of proof, it is somewhat surprising that I have been unable to find an extensive discussion of
standards of proof for legal interpretation in any scholarly work or judicial opinion. My principal
aim in writing this Essay is simply to call attention to this problem, so that wiser heads than mine
can address the many issues that it raises.
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correct for all propositions). 56 A philosopher might reject this standard
on the epistemological ground that it undercuts itself by denying the possibility of the knowledge necessary to formulate and use the concepts
required to express any criteria of knowledge. Practical lawyers, by contrast, will dismiss both this reasoning and the assertion of the beyond-aconceivable-doubt standard that spawned it as ivory-tower dilettantism.
The legal system, they will say with exasperation, exists in order to help
people make real-world decisions. Even if all of the philosophers in the
world maintained that, in some ultimate sense, knowledge is indeed impossible, people would still have to act, and the legal system would still
have to muddle through as best it could. So, they will continue, while
philosophers can bicker until they are blue in the face over the deep philosophical status of the beyond-a-conceivable-doubt standard, the law
must reject it for the simple reason that its adoption would make the
law's work impossible.
Underlying the practical lawyer's approach is the premise that legal
interpretation is only important to the extent that it gives the lawyer information about the likely actions of people who can alter the wealth
positions of lawyer and57client. Why else, after all, would anyone engage
in legal interpretation?
For the practical lawyer and client, there is probably no other reason. In particular, even if there is such a thing as the metaphysically true
meaning of a legal text, discovering it will not be high on the lawyer's list
of things to do. No client will pay a lawyer $200 per hour to discover the
metaphysically true meaning of a statute unless there is a high degree of
probability that this meaning will affect the behavior of the official agents
who will seize the client's person or property, violently if necessary, if she
loses the case. If those agents are looking for a metaphysically true
meaning to guide their actions, the lawyer should of course try to duplicate their inquiry, even if the lawyer (perhaps joined this time by an army
of philosophers) thinks that the whole notion of metaphysically true
meanings of legal texts is balderdash. In sum, the lawyer's concern is not
with "truth" in an abstract sense, but with what other persons within the
legal system regard as sufficient truth to warrant particular actions.
In short, a lawyer who advised his client about a statute's metaphysically true meaning (if such exists) instead of the meaning actually
used by real-world legal actors might live long, but probably would not
prosper. As John Harrison has put it, "[1]egal realism is an accurate
description of the market for legal services,"'5 8 and it is therefore an accu56 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
57 Cf.Eric D. Green, Foreword, 66 B.U. L. REV. 377, 377 (1986) ("The central question in
evidence is, 'What does it mean to prove something so that a court will either order a person imprisoned or order a transfer of money or property?' ").
58 John Harrison, The Role ofthe Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpretingthe Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 371, 372 (1988).
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rate description of the interpretative aspect of the lawyer's craft. For the
lawyer and client, legal interpretation involves predictions of how certain
other people will react to the existence and presentation of legal texts,
which predictions in turn can serve as guides to the conduct of the lawyer and client.5 9 In the functional context of the practical lawyer's art,
an interpretationis legally "true" to the extent that it accuratelypredicts
or describes the behavior of official agents or private actors of concern to
the client.
That predictive art, like any other cognitive enterprise, can be analyzed using the law's three-part structure for the proof of facts. To justify a conclusion about the likelihood of some actor's conduct, including
its degree of likelihood, the lawyer and client must consider (1) what
counts as evidence of likelihood, (2) how much significance to give to
that evidence, and (3) how much evidence one must have in order to
warrant a particular claim. Thus, the practical lawyer and client, like
anyone else, must adopt some standard of proof for their interpretative
enterprise.
Significantly, the lawyer and client's choice of a standard of proof
cannot be based solely on general principles of epistemology. Those principles may be sufficient when metaphysical truth is at issue, but not when
"truth" functionally means, as it will for the lawyer and client, "a sufficient basis for action." Which standard one should select in such circumstances is, like all other questions concerning human conduct, within
the domain of moral theory and can only be answered by reference to
normative considerations.
The point is obvious, but worth stating. The degree of certainty,
and hence the standard of proof, that people require before accepting
propositions as true for particular purposes varies with the consequences
of that acceptance. 60 If accepting a proposition as true for some purpose
means that one should act in a particular way, there does not appear to
be any sensible way to select a standard of proof without reference to the
consequences of that action. For example, suppose that a client is considering whether to enter into a business transaction whose legality is
open to some question. How certain must the client be that the action is
legal before taking the action-that is, what standard of proof should the
client adopt with respect to interpretations concerning the likely reactions of official agents to the relevant legal texts? The answer obviously
depends upon the consequences of those agents' conclusions about the
legality or illegality of the client's conduct. If interference by official
agents will generate $X in costs while unmolested consummation of the
transaction will yield $Y in benefits, the degree of confidence that the
client must have in order to warrant entering into the transaction plainly
59 See generally D'AMATo, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 15, at 7-10.

60 See generally Craig R. Callen, Kicking Rocks with Dr. Johnson:A Comment on ProfessorAllen's Theory, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 423, 440 (1991).
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depends on, interalia, the values of X and Y. People will generally deem
it rational to require more and better evidence before taking action that
could, if things go badly, result in incarceration for life than for action
that could, if things go badly, result in nothing worse than a few moments of aggravation and lost time.
All of which means that scholars cannot give advice to practical
lawyers and clients as to what standard of proof they should adopt for
their interpretative enterprises, beyond the general injunction to consult
their values, consider the consequences, and act rationally. No single
standard can universally be prescribed as "correct." One perhaps could
say as a general matter that one should be sure of interpretations beyond
a rational doubt, but whether a doubt is or is not rational in this context
is a function both of the evidence for and against the various interpretations at issue and the consequences of adopting a particular interpretation. The lawyer and client are on their own, and their decision cannot
sensibly be made without reference to values.
B.

Proofand Normativity in the Law

As with lawyers and clients, judges and legislators are concerned
with the operation of a real-world legal system. To the extent that they
think about the problem of standards of proof in adjudication, they
will-and must-do so in light of some theory about the ends served by
adjudication. 6 1 This point can be illuminated by looking at the ways in
which the law has dealt with standards of proof when it has given the
subject explicit consideration.
1. Standardsof ProofforFacts.-The simple observation that consequences affect one's choice of standards of proof largely explains our
legal system's diverse array of standards of proof for facts. Consider the
two most important standards: Factual propositions in criminal trials
must be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt, while factual propositions in civil trials must be proved by the party asserting
them merely by a preponderance of the evidence. To the best of my
knowledge, the only plausible justification that has been put forward for
this difference in standards is that the consequences of a criminal conviction, potentially including incarceration and its accompanying stigma,
are more severe than the consequences of a civil verdict; 62 and that offi61 That is, official agents will regard legal interpretation as a useful activity only if they have
already decided, on normative grounds, that a particular theory of interpretation should serve as an
antecedent in a hypothetical imperative: if interpretation X is correct in accordance with theory of
interpretation Y, then action Z is appropriate.
62 I will not discuss at length the extent to which one can explain other standards, such as the

clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, on these grounds, but it seems evident that similar considerations drive their usage. The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, for example, surfaces when
especially important values are thought to be at stake. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24

(1979).
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cial agents of a legal system should therefore be concerned in the former
case, but not the latter, about the likely distribution of errors when invoking the system's enforcement mechanisms. 63 That is, when the immediate consequences of a particular factual finding can be the incarceration
(or execution) of a defendant, a higher threshold is required for the proof
of facts than when the immediate consequences can only be the seizure of
the defendant's property.64 As Justice Harlan explained in In re Winship:
In a civil suit between two private parties for money damages, for example,
we view it as no more serious in general for there to be an erroneous verdict
in the defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the
plaintiff's favor. A preponderance of the evidence standard therefore seems
peculiarly appropriate ....
In a criminal case, on the other hand, we do not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty. As Mr. Justice Brennan wrote for the Court in
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526 (1958):
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing
error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this
margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing
on the other party the burden . .. of persuading the fact

finder at the conclusion
of the trial of his guilt beyond a rea'6 5
sonable doubt."
This rationale for applying different standards of proof to factual
63 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970); id. at 370-72 (Harlan, J., concurring); McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 798-99 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972).
The concept of criminal stigma subsumes the sometimes-heard view that a higher standard of proof
has the symbolic function of "singl[ing] out criminal convictions as peculiarly serious among the
adjudications made by courts." Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice"Burdens of Persuasionin CriminalCases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1307 (1977). See also Winship, 397 U.S. at
364.
Professor Ronald Allen locates the justification for the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in
the fact that, while civil trials "are designed to resolve disputes in an amicable fashion among parties
who are indistinguishable before the law," Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66
B.U. L. REv. 401, 437 (1986), criminal trials "pit an individual against the virtually inexorable
power of the state." Id. This is a considerably more persuasive rationale than the one advanced in
the text, but it does not explain the specific standard of proof assignments observable in our legal
system. An individual-against-the-state rationale would require application of a higher standard of
proof not only in criminal litigation, but also in civil litigation in which the government is a party.
Furthermore, once standards of proof are allowed to shift with the resources of the parties, it is hard
to confine that rationale to government litigation, as private civil litigation often involves greater
disparities of resources than litigation between government departments with limited budgets and
private parties.
64 1 say "immediate" consequences, because if the civil defendant tries to keep his property from
being seized, the consequences can be the same as if the criminal defendant tries to keep his person
from being seized: uniformed people with guns start shooting.
65 Winship, 397 U.S. at 371-72 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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assertions in civil and criminal trials seems remarkably unpersuasive, or
at least overly general: surely many defendants would prefer some very
small amount of criminal incarceration and stigma to some very large
amount of civil damage judgments. Indeed, a case can be made that the
reasonable doubt standard in criminal trials should generally be extended
to civil trials. 66 The important point for now, however, is simply that the
law has self-consciously molded its standards of proof for facts to the
value-laden purposes that it sees being served by civil and criminal
adjudication.
2. Standardsof ProofforLaw.-The same kinds of normative considerations, whatever they might be, that drive one's choice of standards
of proof for fact-finding in adjudication bear as well on the choice of
standards for legal interpretation by official agents of a legal order. Furthermore, the epistemological equivalence of legal and factual propositions suggests that whatever standard of proof one selects in a given
context for questions of fact is also at least prima facie appropriate for
questions of law in that same context. 67 This presumption of equivalence
in standards can of course be overcome if there is some normative reason
to treat questions of fact and questions of law differently, but those reasons must be asserted and defended.
Notwithstanding the epistemological parallels between factual and
legal propositions, in those instances in which the law has asserted and
defended standards of proof for legal propositions, it has done so largely
without reference to the governing standards for proof of facts. The reasons for and implications of this dual approach are examined in Part III.
For now, I wish only to catalogue the most important areas in which the
law has openly deliberated on the appropriate standard of proof for propositions of law, 68 without deeply examining whether those standards

66 The claim that official legal actors should be satisfied with a random, but even, distribution of
errors in civil cases assumes that the only serious question in civil litigation is which party should

walk away with a given pot of resources. But in virtually every dispute, one or the other party will
be in (actual or constructive) possession of the disputed resources; and one of the parties will therefore be asking agents of the state to disrupt the status quo. If one believes in the presumptive normative primacy of the status quo, perhaps because it requires coercion to change it, one would have a
lower tolerance of error. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
67 This is true whether cases should be broken down into individual elements or analyzed as
fully specified wholes. On an elements approach, if each relevant fact must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt, each relevant question of law, such as whether a criminal defendant's conduct falls
within the prohibition of a statute, should presumptively be subject to the same standard of proof. If
the appropriate question is simply whether the plaintiff or prosecutor has made out a case for recov-

ery or conviction, that case includes whatever propositions of law are necessary to complete it, and
the unitary standard of proof applicable to the case as a whole will therefore "apply" to those legal
propositions. See generally Allen, supra note 31.
68 The ensuing discussion is confined to so-called "pure" questions of law, as distinguished from

'mixed" questions of law and fact. A legal question is "pure" if it can meaningfully be asked in the
abstract, without reference to the facts of particular cases. For example, one can ask "What is the
appropriate formulation of the legal standard for negligence?" without reference to any particular
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have been adequately justified.
(a) Appellate review.-There is one respect in which the law
seems to provide a complete specification of the appropriate standards of
proof: appellatecourts are always, at least in principle, given standards by
which they are supposed to evaluate lower tribunals' conclusions of law.
There is often, however, less to those standards than meets the eye.
(i) De novo review of legal conclusions.-As the Supreme
Court has recently emphasized, the ordinary standard for appellate
courts to apply when reviewing conclusions of law reached by lower
tribunals is de novo, or independent, review. 69 The law's rationale for
this rule is self-consciously normative: "Independent appellate review of
legal issues best serves the dual goals of doctrinal coherence and economy of judicial administration. '70 Coherence is served, the argument
runs, by assuring that the law is applied uniformly within a jurisdiction,
which might not happen under a system of deferential review in which an
appellate court could uphold multiple divergent but plausible legal interpretations. 71 Economy of administration is thought to be promoted by
utilizing the institutional advantages that appellate courts have over initial decisionmakers. Appellate courts, especially when they employ multimember panels, are structurally well suited to address abstract legal
questions, 72 and they generally have more time to focus on questions of
73
law than do lower tribunals with case-management responsibilities.
Hence, the law instructs appellate courts to apply a de novo standard for
legal questions unless there are valid considerations that suggest
otherwise. 74
In an important sense, however, the de novo standard of review is
not truly a distinct standard of proof. In order to determine whether a
conduct. One cannot, however, ask "Was X's conduct negligent?" without reference to specific
facts. The latter is therefore a "mixed" question of law and fact. More than occasionally, "mixed"
conclusions that appear to be legal are classified by courts as factual, and thus (at least in federal
appeals courts) are made subject to the "clearly erroneous" standard of proof of Rule 52(a). See 9
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2589, at

756-59 (1971). Similarly, conclusions that are arguably factual are sometimes treated as legal for
purposes of appellate review. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985) (holding that the
question of the voluntariness of a confession "is a legal question requiring independent... determination"). I do not want to get bogged down here in disputes over how, or even whether, to classify
questions as legal or factual. My concern is exclusively with standards of proof for questions that are
universally acknowledged to be purely legal by conventional classifications.
69 See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1221 (1991).
70 Id.

71 See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 585 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study ofFederalCircuit Court Deference to
District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L. Rav. 899, 911 (1989).
72 See Coenen, supra note 71, at 911.
73 See id.
74 See infra notes 76-98 and accompanying text.
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proposition of law is legally true, one must know the applicable principles of admissibility, significance, and magnitude. The rule of de novo
review tells appellate courts that they should apply to propositions of law
the same epistemological principles that the lower tribunal should have
applied. If the lower tribunal, for example, should have applied a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof to its legal conclusions, the
appellate court should apply the same standard when evaluating those
legal conclusions. But that is only meaningful guidance if one knows the
standard of proof that the lower tribunal should have applied. The principle of de novo review is thus parasitic on the legal-truth-determining
principles that the law specifies for initial decisionmakers. If the law
does not explicitly specify a standard of proof for initial decisionmakers,
as it generally does not, 7 5 it is distinctly unhelpful to tell appellate courts
to apply the same standard.
(ii) Deferential review of legal conclusions.-There are
some limited contexts in which appellate courts are explicitly told to apply specific standards of proof to legal questions. Three examples come
to mind; there may well be others.
The most obvious example of an explicit standard of proof for appellate review of pure legal questions is the "Chevron doctrine, '7 6 which
governs federal court review of the legal conclusions of federal administrative agencies. When an agency interprets a statute which it is charged
with administering, reviewing courts must affirm if the agency's interpretation is "permissible" 77 or "reasonable. 78 This doctrine functions as a
pure standard-of-proof principle whenever admissibility and significance
rules are not at issue. If the agency and court agree on what items count
and how much they count for or against various statutory meanings, the
Chevron doctrine tells courts to affirm the agency's conclusion even if it
75 See infra notes 101-13 and accompanying text.
76 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
77 See id. at 842-43.
78 See Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, 111 S.Ct. 2524, 2535 (1991). Although a full discussion of
the Chevron doctrine's intricacies would require a book, two aspects of the doctrine merit clarification here. First, the word "administer" in this context is a term of art. The Department of Justice,
for example, "administers" the federal criminal code in a functional sense, but not in the specialized
sense contemplated by the Chevron doctrine. See Crandon v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 997, 1011
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). It is impossible to state definitively when an agency's
responsibility for a statute will rise to the level of "administration" within the meaning of Chevron,
compare Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1991) with id. at 925-28 (Williams,
J., dissenting), but administrative lawyers usually know it when they see it.
Second, the Chevron doctrine is formulated as a two-step inquiry: if Congress "has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue ....that is the end of the matter," 467 U.S. at 842, but if the
statute is ambiguous, "the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843. It is more direct, however, simply to ask the
unitary question whether the agency's interpretation of a statute is reasonable or permissible, on the
understanding that an interpretation at odds with the statute's plain meaning is neither reasonable
nor permissible. Both formulations are substantively identical.
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seems less likely than not to be correct, and indeed even if the court
thinks that an ordinally superior alternative is available, provided only
that the agency's decision is within a zone of reasonableness. 79 This standard of proof, of course, is hardly a model of precision, but then neither
are the long-established standards for proof of facts. 80 Even if one cannot definitively say what the Chevron standard is (or even whether it is

one standard or many),81 one can at least say what it is not: it is not as

demanding as a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, or even as de2
manding as a best-available-alternative standard.
The reasons for the law's adoption of this standard are even less
clear than the standard's definition. No court decision, including Chev83
ron itself, clearly sets forth a comprehensive rationale for the doctrine.
Indeed, there may not be a single rationale; the doctrine may have developed as a result of numerous different rationales coalescing around a
common core. One point seems clear, however: The Chevron doctrine is
not legally compelled. 84 Its rationale, if any, must be found in normative
85
considerations of judicial administration and political theory.
Pure legal conclusions of trial courts are occasionally said to be re79 If admissibility and significance rules are not held constant, all bets are off. An agency interpretation might be reasonable under one set of admissibility and significance rules but unreasonable
under another-for example, where dispute centers on the appropriate weight to be given to a statute's legislative history. See, eg., Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2490
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with the majority's judgment of reversal,
but indicating that he would affirm if he believed that legislative history was entitled to significant
weight in statutory interpretation).
80 Indeed, it is considered to be a serious question whether it is reversible error for a trial judge
even to attempt to define the reasonable doubt standard for jurors. See United States v. Hall, 854
F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that reasonable doubt instructions do not per se constitute reversible error, but strongly advising against their use).
81 Reasonableness or permissibleness could refer to a fixed point on the horizon, or it could be a
context-dependent moving target. This is currently one of the most perplexing questions regarding
the application of Chevron. See Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialDeference to Executive Precedent, 101
YALE L.J. 969, 977-78 (1992).
82 For discussion of the best-available-alternative standard, see infra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
83 See Merrill, supra note 81, at 985-90 (discussing discontinuities between the rationale of Chevron and subsequent development of the Chevron doctrine).
84 It is plainly not constitutionally compelled; no one believes that Congress could not, if it were
so inclined, pass a statute requiring de novo review of agency conclusions of law. See Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 515-16.
Nor is it compelled by statute. Particular statutes, including the statute at issue in Chevron, may
well expressly or impliedly call for deferential review, but Chevron creates an across-the-board principle, which emphatically does not require courts to determine in each case that deference is statutorily mandated.
85 Administrative reasons might include the belief (whether justified or unjustified) that an
agency is in a better position than are appellate courts to understand the intricacies of that agency's
statutes. Political reasons might include the judgment that when statutory interpretation contains a
heavy element of policymaking, as it often does in the modem administrative state, executive branch
officials are more appropriate policymakers than unelected federal judges.
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viewable in accordance with standards similar, if not identical, to the
Chevron standard. One relatively clear example concerns review of attorney's fee awards against the federal government under the Equal Access
to Justice Act. The Act generally authorizes courts to award fees and
expenses "to a prevailing party other than the United States... in any
civil action. . . brought by or against the United States ..., unless the
court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified."' 86 The question whether the United States' position is "substantially justified" will often involve fact-specific matters concerning the
government's conduct, 87 but sometimes the sole question on appeal will
be the purely legal question whether the government's interpretation of a
statute was reasonable enough to be "substantially justified. 8 8 The
Supreme Court has instructed appellate courts to review fee award determinations on a deferential, abuse-of-discretion standard, even in the latter class of cases. 89 That standard appears to be comparable, if not quite
identical, to the reasonableness or permissibleness standard prescribed by
the Chevron doctrine. 90 The Supreme Court has adopted it for reasons of
judicial administration: de novo review would be time consuming without producing the social benefits that usually flow from appellate rulings
on law (because courts are only deciding whether a government position
at some time in the past was reasonable), and the possibility of such second-hand appellate legal rulings would encourage needless appeals by the
government. 9 1
A similar standard might apply when appellate courts review the
imposition of sanctions on parties or attorneys under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court has instructed appellate courts to "apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all
aspects of a district court's Rule 11 determination," 92 which presumably
includes those aspects that involve conventionally denominated legal
questions. If this holding means what it says, then appellate courts
should be applying a standard of proof for trial court conclusions of law
in Rule 11 matters that is in the same range as, and surely no harsher
than, the reasonableness standard under the Chevron doctrine. There is
good reason to believe, however, that one cannot take the Court's statement seriously, as it elsewhere declares that "[a] district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of
the law."'93 If a judge abuses his or her discretion by adopting an "erro86 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1988).
87 See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560 (1988).
88 See id. ("In some cases, such as the present one, the attorney's fee determinations will involve
a judgment ultimately based upon evaluation of the purely legal issue governing the litigation.").
89 See id. at 560-63.
90 See id. at 563-66.
91 See id.at 560-61.
92 Cooter & Gell v.Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990) (emphasis added).
93 id. at 2461.
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neous" view of the law, then the standard of review is really de novo, 94
and the standard of proof on appeal is not reasonableness but rather
whatever standard should have been employed by the district court. Assuming, however, that an abuse-of-discretion standard applies to pure
legal questions, the standard's stated rationale is straightforwardly administrative: trial courts are better situated than are appellate courts to
make the "fact-specific" 95 determinations required by Rule 11;96 local
courts are more likely to be familiar with local litigation practices; 97 and
"[d]eference to the determination of courts on the front lines of litigation
'9 8
will enhance these courts' ability to control the litigation before them.
Until recently, one could have added a fourth example to this list:
federal appellate courts would often review district court interpretations
of state law on a deferential standard. 99 The Supreme Court, however,
has now instructed appellate courts to review such determinations de
novo. lOO

(i) Standardsof review and standardsofproof-The relationship between standards of review and standards of proof is somewhat muddy. First, the principal standard of review for pure legal
questions-de novo review-does not itself prescribe a particular standard of proof but rather incorporates other standards by reference. Second, appellate review by definition only occurs after some officially
recognized legal actor has made an initial decision. It is therefore not
surprising that when the law specifies distinctive standards of proof for
appellate review of legal propositions, those standards are relatively undemanding. Nor is it surprising that discussion of those standards focuses almost exclusively on considerations of judicial administration. As
is true when appellate courts review factual findings on a deferential standard, propositions of law that ought to be deemed legally false at the trial
stage sometimes ought to be deemed legally true on appeal.
For these and other reasons, it is both more interesting and more
important to identify the standards of proof that initial legal decisionmakers should apply when deciding questions of law. I will first try
94 It is evident that the Court used "erroneous" to mean "not correct." The rest of the abovequoted sentence reads, "or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence." Id. (emphasis added).
The phrase "assessment of the evidence" obviously refers to review of fact-finding, which is governed
by the clearly-erroneous standard of Rule 52(a). The clearly-erroneous standard for review of factfinding thus stands in sharp contrast to the "erroneous," or de novo, standard for review of lawfinding.
95 110 S. Ct. at 2460.
96 See id. at 2459, 2460.
97 Id. at 2460.
98 Id.
99 See Coenen, supra note 71, at 901-04.
100 See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1221 (1991). Interestingly, the Court
nonetheless reserved to itself the right to defer to lower courts on questions of state law. Id. at 1223
n.3. One is reminded of the frequency with which Congress exempts itself from regulatory laws.
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to identify the standards operative in the American legal system and then
briefly suggest, without much in the way of supporting argument, some
considerations that may be relevant for evaluating those standards.
(b) Initial law-finding.-By and large, the law says nothing to
initial decisionmakers who wonder what standard of proof they should
apply to propositions of law. Fact finders are always given a standard;
law finders are generally on their own.
The few circumstances in which the law explicitly prescribes a standard of proof for propositions of law can be grouped together under the
general heading of clear-statement rules: under certain conditions, propositions of law should be accepted by decisionmakers only if they are
unmistakably compelled by the relevant admissibility and significance
rules and evidence sets. To the best of my knowledge, the only legal
propositions for which the law provides a specific standard of proof other
than a clear-statement rule are propositions of foreign law, to which a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies. The implications of this
treatment of foreign law are discussed at length in Part III; the remainder of Part II considers the treatment of domestic law.
(i) Clear-statement rules.-The most widely applicable
clear-statement rule is the rule of lenity, which requires that ambiguities
in criminal statutes be resolved against the government. 10 1 Although formulations of the rule of lenity have sometimes seemed to require a high
threshold of proof for construction of a criminal statute against a defendant, 10 2 recent decisions suggest that the rule today has little force. 103 The
normative considerations underlying this rule are obviously the same as
those underlying the reasonable doubt standard for proof of facts in
criminal proceedings: criminal incarceration and stigma are deemed to be
categorically more consequential than other legal outcomes and accordingly require a stricter standard of proof.I°4 I am aware of no case, however, that has taken this justification to its seemingly logical conclusion
and urged adoption of a beyond-a-reasonable-doubtstandard for proving
legal propositions in criminal cases.
Another clear-statement rule concerns the availability of judicial review of federal administrative action under the Administrative Proce101 See James C. Quarles, Some Statutory Construction Problems and Approaches in Criminal
Law, 3 VAND. L. REv. 531, 532-33 (1950).
102 See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348-49 (1971) (reiterating that criminal statutes must
"plainly and unmistakably" cover the conduct in question); United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476,
485 (1917) (stating that "before a man can be punished as a criminal under the federal law his case
must be plainly and unmistakably within the provisions of some statute").
103 See Moskal v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 461, 465 (1990).
104 See Bass, 404 U.S. at 348.
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dure Act. 10 5 The statute has long been construed to create a strong
presumption in favor of the availability of judicial review, such that
"only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary
10 6
legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review."
Whether the rule was judicially discovered or invented, it obviously reflects a straightforward normative preference for legal checks on executive action.
A number of other clear-statement rules are driven by what might
be called normative constitutional considerations, which focus on the effects of legal findings on government actors, much as the law's choice of
standards for proof of facts focuses on the effects of factual findings on
private actors. The best known rule is the doctrine of avoidance, which
holds that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional
problems.10 7 As the Supreme Court has stated, "an Act of Congress
ought not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible
construction remains available." 10 8 The doctrine is straighforwardly
grounded in the respect due a coordinate branch of government.l °9
Other clear-statement rules reflect similar prudential concerns about
encroachments on federalism. Courts will not hold federal statutes to
preempt traditionally exercised state authority "'unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' "110 Nor will they deem statutes to impose conditions on the receipt of federal funds by states unless
"Congress spoke so clearly that we can fairly say that the State could
make an informed choice" ' about whether to accept the funds. And
courts will only read federal statutes to abrogate the sovereign immunity
105 See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988) ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.").
106 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967). Subsequent cases have confused
rather than clarified the meaning of this standard. Compare Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1984) (cautioning that "[tihis Court has ...never applied the 'clear and
convincing evidence' standard in the strict evidentiary sense") with Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System of the United States v. MCorp Financial, 112 S. Ct. 459, 466 (1991) (suggesting
that "clear and convincing evidence" does indeed mean "clear and convincing evidence").
107 See Rust v. Sullivan, 11 1 S.Ct. 1759, 1771 (1991); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
108 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) (emphasis added),
[mis]quoted in Rust, 111 S.Ct. at 1771.
109 See FloridaGulf Coast, 485 U.S. at 575 ("This approach not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like
this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution."). The same rationale no
doubt underlies the venerable rule that courts should only disregard laws when their unconstitutionality is "so clear that it is not open to rational question." James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). Today, however,
that "rule" barely receives lip service.
110 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
111 Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981).
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of states if that meaning is "unmistakable" 112, a principle that holds as
well for federal statutes that are claimed to abrogate federal sovereign
immunity.113
The significance of such clear-statement rules for my analysis is uncertain. They obviously cover only a fraction of the propositions of law
with which our legal system must deal, and it is not even clear what they
mean in the cases to which they apply. The various clear-statement rules
might be independent specifications of distinctive standards of proof,
though it is not clear how, if at all, such standards relate to any of the
familiar standards for proof of facts. Or they could simply be instructions to raise the standard(s)of proof that would otherwise be applicable.
In the latter case, the standard of proof denoted by a clear-statement rule
could not be known unless one first knew the baseline standard from
which it was deviating, just as one cannot know the standard of proof
required by a principle of de novo review unless one knows the standard
that ought to be applied by the initial decisionmaker. In either case, it is
critical to know the background standard(s) that generally governs initial
law-finding in the absence of an articulated clear-statement standard.
(ii) Is the best-available-alternative standard the best
available alternative?.-A background standard (or standards) for initial
determinations of law must exist whether or not it is acknowledged or
recognized by the persons applying it. Identifying that standard (or standards) in the context of our legal system, however, is no mean feat. I am
aware of no serious discussion of this question in any judicial opinion or
work of scholarship. Whatever standard is applied by legal actors appears to have arisen largely by default.
Nonetheless, I will venture to say that our legal system, for
whatever reason or reasons, has in fact tacitly converged on a single,
identifiable standard. Virtually every fleeting reference to the standardof-proof problem that I have seen in a judicial opinion or work of scholarship (and most of them are too fleeting to warrant citation), and every
verbal comment by every person to whom I have posed this problem, all
point toward a single standard for initial determinations of law: a legal
4
interpretation is correct if it is better than its available alternatives. 11 If
112 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985). See also Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
113 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114 A few scholars have been explicit, if not entirely self-conscious, about their selection of this
standard. See, eg., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 44 (1977) ("We might want to
say that a legal obligation exists whenever the case supporting such an obligation.., is stronger than
the case against it."); Akhil Reed Amar, Taking Article 1II Seriously:A Reply to ProfessorFriedman,
85 Nw. U. L. REV. 442, 443 (1991) ("[tlhe real question [is]: which reading of article III... is the
best?"); Kress, supranote 23, at 335 ("a litigant has a right to a decision in her favor if the principles
that can be adduced in support of her claim are the tiniest bit more powerful than the principles
against it"). For a dissenting voice, see Barry Friedman, FederalJurisdictionandLegal Scholarship:
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I am right that a best-available-alternative standard generally governs the
legal world's acceptance of propositions of law, that standard should be
subjected to careful, deliberative scrutiny, as it raises normative questions
of the highest order.
The determination that one interpretation is "better" than another
is a function of principles of admissibility and significance. That is, admissibility and significance rules, applied to particular evidence sets, determine the relative rankings of competing interpretations. The further
proposition that relative rankings themselves justify legal truth claims,
however, cannot be derived from principles of admissibility and significance alone. There is nothing epistemologically inevitable about the
best-available-alternative standard. As the previous discussion suggests
(and as Part III explains in more detail), one can perfectly well imagine a
regime in which legal propositions are considered true for particular purposes only when they are supported by enough evidence (as evaluated by
applicable principles of admissibility and significance) to satisfy some
heightened standard, such as a preponderance-of-the-evidence or beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test. Indeed, not only is the best-available-alternative standard not inevitable, it is in many respects highly
problematic. Most obviously, in many circumstances the best available
alternative might be a very poor one. 115
The simplest way to dramatize the consequences of a best-availablealternative standard is to imagine a cardinal system of evaluating evidence, in which it is possible to specify a numerical probability for any
proposition's legal truth. All of my conclusions can be recast in terms of
ordinal measurement if one accepts the meaningfulness of using exem1 16
plary propositions as boundary markers for degrees of certainty.
If there are only two mutually exhaustive interpretative options (and
if the relevant evidence set is complete), a best-available-alternative standard for justifying legal truth claims will always yield a conclusion that is
at least as likely as not to be metaphysically correct according to the
relevant interpretative theory.1 17 Problems arise, however, whenever the
A (Dialogic)Reply, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 478, 480 (1991) ("'Correct' must mean... [someone] has
offered such a clearly persuasive interpretation of article III's meaning that it will serve to eliminate
all legitimate disagreement, and thus foreclose any dialogue on the subject.").
115 If one objects (as has Michael Perry in conversation) that the best available alternative would
never seriously be put forward as legally true, but merely as more likely true than any of its alternatives, one is tacitly adopting a standard of proof different from, and more rigorous than, the bestavailable-alternative standard. There is nothing wrong with doing so; indeed, my whole point here is
that there may be much right with doing so. But one should then identify the more rigorous standard that one is adopting.
116 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
117 "Metaphysically correct" in this context means that the conclusion would in fact correspond
to the world if the relevant interpretative theory's principles of admissibility and significance were
appropriate for the discovery of metaphysical truth. To explain further what I mean would require
an extended essay on the nature of the world(s) to which interpretative propositions can correspond.
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choice of plausible interpretations is not binary-which in the law is to
say almost always. For illustrative purposes, imagine a situation in
which, given our principles of admissibility and significance, there are
five plausible competing interpretations of a particular text. Suppose further that there is a 21% chance that interpretation A is correct and a 19
3/4% chance that the same is true of each of interpretations B-E. Under
a best-available-alternative standard, A must be deemed the legally true
interpretation, even though there is barely a 1-in-5 chance that the relevant theory would judge it to be metaphysically correct. Similarly, A can
be ordinally more plausible than any of B-E but still be less certain than
an exemplary proposition that is taken to mark a very low level of certainty.118 As the number of plausible competitors increases, so does the
possibility of an interpretation being deemed legally true when the assumedly proper interpretative theory would assign it a very low likelihood of actually corresponding to the relevant interpretative world.
The best-available-alternative standard begins to look especially suspect when one focuses on the real-world purposes and effects of adjudication. Lawsuits involve one party asking uniformed people with guns to
control the behavior of other parties. Although the uniformed people
seldom have to use their guns to enforce judicial orders in modem American society, the threat is always there. As the late Arthur Leff so eloquently put it, "behind every . . .judge stands ultimately the naked

power of the 101st Airborne Division." 119 A decision by a prosecutor, a
judge, or a marshal that the law requires thus-and-so is often a predicate
for bringing into motion the coercive apparatus of the State and for rearranging control over resources. In the extreme case where a party resists
judicial orders by force, the legal system must either call out the troops
and gun down the recalcitrant citizen or give up and go home. 120 In a
legal system, such as ours, in which legal commands are generally viewed
as coercively enforceable, the moral question facing any official asked to
issue or enforce a command is whether she is prepared to have the defendant shot for noncompliance-and to risk the shooting of some of the
enforcement agents. If one is not prepared to see the defendant shot dead
if he resists, one has no business invoking the law.
The question of when it is appropriate to shoot people dead is a
central question of political theory, and I obviously have no intention of
answering it here. But it does seem as though one ought to be very sure
that such action is warranted before one sets the legal system into motion. Even if one has identified a set of events that would justify shooting
people-I, for example, would permit it when the defendant is in posses118 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
119 Arthur Alan Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 997 (1978).
120 This latter result is not unthinkable. One certainly could have a legal system in which prescribed norms are "enforced" purely through social pressure, boycotts, or ostracism rather than
through officially sanctioned violence.
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sion of the plaintiff's property and refuses upon proper request to return
it-a best-available-alternative standard, or even a preponderance-of-theevidence standard, does not seem to provide the requisite certainty that
that set of events (such as the defendant retaining property that really
does belong to the plaintiff) has in fact occurred. The standard of proof
for such decisionmaking ought to be reasonably stiff, on the order of a
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, whether the underlying suit is civil
or criminal.
The plausibility of this model of adjudication, and hence of the standard of proof that it suggests, is at best incidental to my principal positive
claims in this Essay, so I do not want to get bogged down defending it.
In any event, a full explication, much less defense, of this model would
require a separate article, as the model gives rise to numerous questions.
Just to list a few: Is the barepossibilitythat deadly force might have to be
employed in a few cases really enough to drive the selection of a standard
of proof for an entire legal system? And how would the standard be
applied in practice? My brief analysis suggests that something like a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof should be imposed on anyone, whether nominally plaintiff or defendant, who seeks to invoke the
coercive apparatus of the legal system to alter the status quo. Hence, it
indicates not only the proper standard of proof but also the proper allocation of the burden of proof, which assumes increasing importance as
the standard becomes more difficult to satisfy. But to say simply that the
person seeking to alter the status quo must bear the burden of proving
her case raises as many questions as it answers. It will not always be
obvious, to say the least, how one defines the status quo, who is in "possession" of disputed resources, and hence who is seeking to justify the use
of coercion. 121 Furthermore, litigation involving the government poses
special problems. Suppose that a taxpayer is seeking a refund from the
government. Is the taxpayer seeking to use coercion to alter the status
quo, or does the inherently coercive character of government obligate it
to justify all of its actions, whenever challenged? And what about a
criminal defendant who invokes a constitutional protection? Must the
121 Suppose, for example, that A really owns a watch. B takes the watch from A by force, whereupon A invokes the machinery ofjustice. The status quo at that point is that B is in possession of the
watch, and A must prove her case with the requisite certainty in order to warrant the use of official
coercion. A, of course, would be free to employ self-help instead. Suppose that A attempts to take
back the watch, and B shamelessly seeks the help of the police. B could probably demonstrate with
the requisite certainty that A was committing an act of aggression, and could thus justify a change in
the status quo (which now includes A attacking B). If no consideration enters the picture other than
A's attack on B, B could thus obtain a restoration of the state of affairs as it stood before A's
aggression. A's defense and counterclaim, of course, would be that A was merely trying to regain her
property, and that in fact the world should be restored to the state of affairs as it stood before B's
aggression. B's response would be, "prove it," and we would be back where we started.
This system, of course, puts a premium on self-help-provided that it is successful. That is not
surprising, as it emanates from a hard natural law view in which the difficult task is to justify the
intervention of law enforcement machinery rather than to justify its absence.
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defendant who claims the benefit of the provision prove its applicability,
or must the government prove its inapplicability?
These are serious questions. Perhaps they are so serious that one
ought to abandon the search for a heightened standard of proof and simply live with a best-available-alternative standard. Perhaps, when all is
said and done, it makes perfectly good sense for the law to refuse to
incarcerate a criminal defendant unless the relevant facts have been established beyond a reasonable doubt but to reject appeals based on the
law so long as the prosecutor's interpretation of the relevant statute is
(taking into account the rule of lenity) the best available alternative.
There may be good reasons to permit armed government agents to order
A to hand over property to B when B has shown merely that her view of
the law is the best available alternative. But if the law believes any of
these things about standards of proof, it should say so and explain why.
The issue is too important to be resolved by default.
C. Some Realism About Scholarship
To the extent that legal scholars purport to give real-world advice to
official agents, and thus put forward interpretations as legally true in the
sense offorming an adequate basis for coercive action, they should apply
the same standards that ought to guide the official agents. If something
stronger than a best-available-alternative standard is necessary to justify
coercive disruption of the status quo, that stronger standard is required
for such scholars. But giving real-world advice is not the only reason
why scholars might engage in interpretation. Unlike the practical lawyer
or the official agent, the scholar can be concerned about interpretative
truth without prescribing that any action (other than, perhaps, the publication of the scholar's work1 22) be taken on the basis of this conclusion.
Accordingly, even if one believes that official agents ought to adopt a
more demanding standard of proof than they have tacitly employed to
date, one may nonetheless deem it appropriate for the legal scholar to
apply a less demanding standard in her work. Indeed, the scholar's enterprise leaves her free to adopt any standard of proof she wishes. The
only constraint is adherence to the virtue of clarity: the scholar should
always identify the standard for legal truth she is applying when making
an interpretative claim.
III. LAW AS FACT IN ADJUDICATION
Given current legal practice, it can make an enormous difference
whether a proposition is classified as factual or legal. In criminal cases,
dispositive factual propositions ("the defendant pulled the trigger") must
be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt before the defendant will be strapped into the chair, but legal propositions ("the de122 See Callen, supra note 60, at 435 n.67.

86:859 (1992)

Proving the Law

fendant's conduct violates the relevant statute") face much lower
hurdles. Although the rule of lenity requires that ambiguities in criminal
statutes be resolved against the government, 123 the government is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the relevant statute
means what the government says it means. Instead, official agents seem
to apply a best-available-alternative standard, though I am aware of no
case in which the issue of standards of proof for textual interpretation
has specifically been addressed. More generally, at least at the stage of
initial decisionmaking, the law does not even consider applying to legal
propositions any of the varied principles that govern the proof of factual
propositions. No one talks about "burdens of proof" for the law (though
clear-statement rules may function as allocations of burdens of proof as
much as they function as standards of proof), and no rules of evidence
exist for establishing propositions of law. Epistemological arguments to
the contrary notwithstanding, "proving the law" seems like an odd
phrase indeed.
It is impossible to be certain why the law freely speaks of proof
when factual propositions are concerned but not when legal propositions
are at issue. One possible explanation for this difference in treatment,
however, presents itself as (for want of a more felicitous phrase) the best
available alternative. The law, as noted, seems tacitly to have adopted a
best-available-alternative standard of proof for legal propositions. The
law's adoption of the best-available-alternative standard may in turn be
driven by the perceived need to have answers to all legal questions-a
need that is not satisfied by more demanding standards. And once a
best-available-alternative standard is in place, it renders proof-talk relatively unimportant.
This hypothetical argument can be constructed as follows: Given a
particular set of admissibility and significance rules, there will frequently
be many interpretations of the relevant text that satisfy a minimal level of
plausibility; and no one of those interpretations may dominate the others
so convincingly that it satisfies some absolute standard like a beyond-areasonable-doubt test, or even a preponderance-of-the-evidence test. In
any such case, if one adopts a demanding, absolute standard, legal actors
will simply be unable to interpretthe text in that particular context. One
could not then say that the plaintiff's proposed interpretation is legally
true, because although it might be (let us assume) better than any alternative, it will not satisfy the requisite evidentiary threshold. But neither
could one say that the defendant's proposed interpretation, or any other
interpretation that the court might find on its own, is true, as by hypothesis these interpretations are inferior to the plaintiff's interpretation,
which itself fails to satisfy the applicable standard. Any system that employs an absolute standard thus leaves open the possibility that no inter123 See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
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pretation will satisfy the standard, effectively leaving no law in such cases
(though an interpretation of the same text might well satisfy the requisite
evidentiary standard, and thus constitute law, in a different application).
Accordingly, the argument might run, a best-available-alternative standard is necessary because it guarantees, subject only to the most bizarre
possibilities of evidentiary equipoise, that there will always be, at least in
principle, a true interpretation for any given legal purpose. And in such
circumstances, evidentiary concepts like burdens of proof simply disappear from the scene. The importance of burdens of proof is directly proportional to the degree of certainty demanded by one's standard of proof.
If legal truth must be ascertained beyond a reasonable doubt, the party
that bears the burden of establishing that truth bears a heavy burden
indeed. But if legal truth involves merely a comparison of alternatives,
the only burden on a party is to produce an alternative-and if the judge
is permitted to take judicial notice of the law, as is probably wise given
the enormous effects that legal rulings can have on unrepresented third
parties, even that burden is dispensable. Thus, the argument concludes,
the legal system does not talk about "proving the law" because a bestavailable-alternative standard is necessary to the management of a legal
system, and it renders such talk irrelevant.
If this is indeed the law's rationale, it provokes an obvious question:
Why is it important that courts always be able to give definitive interpretations of the law? The law certainly does not require that decisionmakers always be able to reach definitive conclusions aboutfacts (nor
does it purport to evaluate factual propositions by a best-available-alternative standard), and the system nonetheless works quite well. Once
again, a look at the way our adjudicatory system handles questions of
fact will cast valuable light on its treatment of questions of law.
A.

Determinate Results from IndeterminateFacts

Suppose that a plaintiff's case depends on a particular finding of fact
X: if the fact finder finds X, the plaintiff wins; if not, the plaintiff loses. A
verdict for the plaintiff thus requires the fact finder affirmatively to conclude that X is legally true. A verdict for the defendant, however, does
not require the fact finder affirmatively to conclude that X is legally false,
or even affirmatively to conclude that X is not legally true. It simply requires the fact finder to fail to conclude that X is legally true, which does
not require any affirmative findings about X.
The point is critical. Failing to conclude that X is legally true is not
the same thing as concluding that X is not legally true. If one reaches no
conclusion at all, one has not concluded that X is legally true, but one
has also not concluded that X is not legally true. Rather, one has concluded nothing. In a system which assigns burdens of proof as well as
standardsof proof, that is enough to decide cases, as the party that bears
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the burden of proof loses whenever the fact finder reaches no conclusion
at all.
A simple example will make the point clear. Suppose that X refers
to whether the bus that struck the plaintiff was part of the defendant's
fleet. A fact finder who reaches a verdict for the defendant might have
made an affirmative finding that the bus was not part of the defendant's
fleet, but might also have reached a conclusion along these lines: "You,
the plaintiff, have not demonstrated in accordance with the applicable
standard of proof that the defendant owned the bus. I am not saying that
the defendant didn't own the bus; I am saying only that you have not
established with the requisite degree of certainty that he did. Maybe if
there is a retrial and you and the defendant produce better evidence sets,
I will reach a different conclusion one way or the other. But because you
have not satisfied the evidentiary criteria for establishing legal truth (and
the defendant has not satisfied the criteria for establishing legal falsity), I
just don't know whether the defendant owned the bus-and since you
have the burden of proof, that is sufficient to warrant judgment for the
defendant." The fact finder, in other words, is not so much passing judgment on the legal truth of the plaintiff's claim as on the sufficiency of the
plaintiff's proof. A different performance by the plaintiff or some other
party, given the same standard of proof and principles of admissibility
and significance, could yield a different result. The law contemplates exactly such a possibility by giving limited application to rules of repose,
such as collateral estoppel and res judicata: it recognizes that fact finders
are evaluating proofs, not finding facts in a hard sense. 124
There is no obvious reason why the same procedure could not be
applied to questions of law. Somebody always bears the burden of proof
with respect to any given question of fact; somebody could also be assigned the burden of proof with respect to any given question of law. For
example, one might say that whichever party is seeking to disrupt the
status quo (whether nominally the plaintiff or defendant) ought to bear
the burden of proof. If that party's demonstration satisfies the requisite
standard of proof for legal truth, it will win; if not, it will lose. 12 5 But its
loss does not have to take the form of an affirmative rejection of its proposed legal interpretation, much less of an affirmative acceptance of some
alternative interpretation. It need involve no more than a finding that
the party has not demonstrated the legal correctness of its proposed in124 Cf. POSNER, supra note 6, at 216-17 ("The function of burden of proof in achieving formal
accuracy is to allow a court to reach a definitive result in a case where it may not have the faintest
idea whether the defendant wronged the plaintiff.").
125 I take no position on whether such a demonstration should involve proof of that legal proposition as a discrete element, as traditional theory suggests, or whether one must somehow integrate
that legal claim into a larger case-as-a-whole, as Professor Allen has strongly urged for issues of fact.
See Allen, supra note 31. Professor Allen's argument seems obviously right and fully generalizable
to questions of law, but the point is not important here.
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terpretation with the requisite quantum of proof. One can rule against a
party without adopting any positive view of what the law is (or is not). 126
As a result, adjudication can be wholly determinate even when the governing interpretative theory is not. Uncertainty about the law can translate into certainty about adjudicative outcomes.
Thus, while there may be good normative reasons somewhere for
applying a best-available-alternative standard to propositions of law, necessity is not among those reasons. The law could, if it so chose, apply to
legal propositions the same standards of proof and allocations of burdens
of proof that it currently applies to factual propositions. Of course, this
approach to questions of law would have a number of important consequences. Before examining them-and, in so doing, hopefully answering
at least some of the many questions that this way of thinking about the
law should prompt-it is worth noting that the idea of treating questions
of law as questions of fact in this fashion is not idle academic speculation.
It has been an important part of the Anglo-American legal system for
centuries, but it has been confined to a narrow aspect of the law that
receives little attention. Nonetheless, we know that this approach to
questions of law can work because it has worked for a good long timewith respect to questions of foreign law.
B.

Proving Foreign Law

The traditional common-law rule in this country has been to treat
questions of foreign law as, for the most part, questions of fact which
must be pleaded and proved in accordance with the ordinary rules of
evidence.1 27 This has meant, at various times and in various combinations, that failure to plead or prove foreign law can result in dismissal of
the case,128 that proof must be by competent evidence introduced by the
parties, such as expert testimony, 12 9 and even that questions of foreign
126 Frank Easterbrook has come very close to endorsing this view of legal interpretation, at least
with respect to statutes. See Frank Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983)
(pointing out that a decision that construction is warranted must logically precede any particular
construction). Judge Posner has taken brief notice of the possibility of using burden-of-proof rules in
legal interpretation, but has rejected the idea without extensive analysis. See POSNER, supra note 6,
at 202, 231-32, 283, 288-91. For a relatively rare judicial application of this approach, see Justice
Scalia's recent opinion for the Court in United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 101416 (1992) (holding, without adopting a specific interpretation of the relevant statute, that an alleged
waiver of federal sovereign immunity was too equivocal to pass a "clear statement" test).
127 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 942 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984); OTTo C. SOMMERICH & BENJAMIN BUSCH, FOREIGN LAW: A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 11 (1959); 9
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 68, at § 2441; Stephen L. Sass, Foreign Law in FederalCourts, 29

AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 97 (1981) [hereinafter Sass, FederalCourts]; William B. Stem, Foreign Law in
the Courts: JudicialNotice and Proof,45 CAL. L. REV. 23, 24-29 (1957). For an interesting historical and comparative account of some of the problems of proving foreign law, see Stephen L. Sass,
Foreign Law in Civil Litigation:A ComparativeSurvey, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 332 (1968).

128 See Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912).
129 See SOMMERICH & BUSCH, supra note 127, at 39-58; Stem, supra note 127, at 31-39.
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law must be answered by the jury where that body is otherwise responsible for fact-finding. 130 Interestingly, while I cannot claim exhaustively
to
13 1 I
have canvassed the extensive literature on the proof of foreign law,
have found no discussion whatsoever of the appropriate standard of
proof for propositions of foreign law-perhaps because they generally
arise only in civil cases, and the applicability of the ordinary preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is simply taken for granted.
While a number of American jurisdictions continue to follow the
traditional path, 132 there has been a substantial amount of twentieth-century judicial and legislative reform, at both the state and federal level, of
the methods for treating and proving foreign law. 133 If one can judge by
the extant academic commentary, there have been three principal reasons
for the abandonment of some or all aspects of the traditional approach to
proving questions of foreign law. First, the requirement of dismissal for
failure to plead or prove foreign law has widely been viewed as unduly
harsh. 134 Second, the methods for proving foreign law permitted by the

traditional approach, which do not necessarily include judicial notice, are
frequently cumbersome and expensive. 135 Third, the idea that juries

should decide questions of foreign law has not gone down well, 136 nor

has the notion that when judges decide such questions, their determina-

tions should be subject only to limited appellate review. 137 Rule 44.1 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, promulgated in 1966, is a representative response to some of these criticisms. The Rule requires notice but
not pleading of a party's intention to rely on foreign law, allows the court
to consider evidence of foreign law that is not introduced by the parties,
makes relevance the sole criterion for admissibility of evidence regarding
foreign law, and provides that foreign law determinations shall be treated
130 See SOMMERICH & BUSCH, supra note 127, at 18; Stem, supra note 127, at 27. For a partial
list of other consequences of the "fact" approach to questions of foreign law, see RUDOLF B.
SCHLESINGER, ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 81-88 (5th ed. 1987) [hereinafter SCHLESINGER].

131 See, eg., Adrien K. Wing, Pleadingand Proof of ForeignLaw in American Courts,A Selected
Annotated Bibliography, 19 STAN. J. INT'L L. 175 (1983).
132 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 130, at 81; John G. Sprankling & George R. Lanyi, Pleading
and Proof of Foreign Law in American Courts, 19 STAN. J. INT'L L. 3, 4 (1983).
133 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 130, at 78-81 (surveying statutes); Sprankling & Lanyi, supra
note 132, at 96-97 (surveying the law in all American states).

134 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 127, at 943; Arthur R. Miller, FederalRule 44.1
and the "Fact"Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65
MICH. L. REv. 615, 633 (1967); Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 132, at 14, 23-24. See also infra
notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
135 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 127, at 942; SOMMERICH & BUSCH, supra note
127, at 18; 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supranote 68, at 405; Sass, FederalCourts,supra note 127, at 10708; Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 132, at 7.
136 See Miller, supra note 134, at 687-88; Arthur Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign
Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1019 n.9 (1941). See also Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 132, at 6 n.12
(appellate review is required to ensure correct application of foreign law).
137 See Miller, supra note 134, at 689-90; Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 132, at 6 n.12.
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as questions of law on appellate review. 138
C. Proving Domestic Law
The experience with the proof of foreign law holds valuable lessons
for the possibility of treating questions of domestic law as epistemologically equivalent to questions of fact. As is suggested above, 139 the most

controversial consequences of the "fact" approach to proving foreign
law-the conclusions that juries rather than judges should decide questions of foreign law, that appellate review of determinations of foreign
law should be limited, and that, perhaps as a result of the early involvement of juries, 140 modes of proof should be confined by strict admissibility rules that minimize the role of judicial notice-all involve the
allocation of decisionmaking authority or other administrative concerns.
My analysis, which deals with the formal epistemological equivalence of
law and fact claims, is agnostic on all of these issues. That analysis says
nothing about who should (or must) decide any of these legal questions,
but pertains only to how those decisions should be made. Nor does it say
anything about what rules of admissibility or significance should be employed in those determinations. One could acknowledge the need to
prove legal propositions by some absolute standard and still believe that
all such decisions should be made by judges subject to de novo appellate
review, and that the judges should not be bound only to the evidence
formally introduced by the parties and screened through stylized admissibility rules.
Once one treats propositions of law as subject to proof, however, it
does require that parties who fail to prove their legal claims in accordance with the applicable standard of proof face dismissal.14 1 Oddly
enough, while one might think it obvious that a party that fails to meet
its burden of proof should lose, this feature of the "fact" approach to
foreign law questions has given rise to heavy criticism, which presumably
would apply a fortiorito more ambitious proposals to extend proof principles to propositions of domestic law. Indeed, courts faced with the
prospect of dismissing a case for failure of proof of foreign law have frequently avoided that result by indulging in (absurd) presumptions about
the applicable law, such as that the law of the relevant foreign country is
138 See FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1:

A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign country shall give notice
by pleadings or other reasonable written notice. The court, in determining foreign law, may
consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a
party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court's determination shall be
treated as a ruling on a question of law.
139 See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
140 Cf Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 132, at 8.
141 It says nothing, however, about whether parties who fail to plead the law must face dismissal
if some other form of notice is provided.
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the same as the law of the forum jurisdiction.1 42 And Professors Wright
and Miller have strongly argued that failure to prove applicable foreign
law should not be fatal to a party's case:
The rare case in which there is a failure of proof of this kind would be an
especially unappealing case for holding that the party whose claim or defense is based on the foreign law must lose, because this would be a case in
which the foreign law could not be ascertained despite the diligent efforts of
both counsel and the trial judge. It simply is not fair to bar a party from
recovering when neither his attorney nor the court is able to conjure up the
content of the governing law. To speak of a failure of proof or to assume
that the party has no rights under the controlling law in these circumstances is inapposite. 143
On its face, this makes no sense. If a party's right to recover depends
upon the law being X, one would think that a failure to show X, either
through party-initiated proofs or through judicial notice, would amount
to a failure to show a right to recover. Why it is "inapposite" for government to do nothing unless there is a discernible legal command to the
contrary is not obvious.
The only explanation for the widespread embrace of this position by
judges and scholars is the apparent belief that whenever a legal rule
seems even plausibly to address a particular subject, the rule must create
some applicable law that governs the relations among parties. Nothing
else can explain either the insistence on the part of courts that some law
must apply to cases even when the applicable foreign law has not been
established or the otherwise bizarre claim by Professors Wright and
Miller that it is "not fair to bar a party from recovering when neither his
attorney nor the court is able to conjure up the content of the governing
law." Moreover, this explanation is consistent with my earlier hypothesis regarding the law's failure to treat questions of domestic law as propositions subject to proof like questions of fact'44-namely, that the use
of an absolute evidentiary threshold for legal conclusions might lead to
(unthinkable) situations in which there is effectively no law governing the
particular relations at issue. For example, suppose Congress enacts a
statute. Presumably, the statute is not meant simply to take up space in
the United States Code; it is supposed to affect the legal rights and obligations of persons. Imagine now that one has chosen a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard as the appropriate test for statutory interpretation.
Any statute whose meaning in a particular context cannot be ascertained
beyond a reasonable doubt will essentially be nullified in that context, as
142 See Miller, supra note 134, at 635-37; see also Yolanda M. Morentin, Note, Failureto Prove
Foreign Law in U.S. Courts, 1988 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 228, 235-40 (describing the various
presumptions that courts have employed).
143 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 68, at 416. See also Arthur Nussbaum, Proofof Foreign
Law in New York'A ProposedAmendment, 57 COLuM. L. REv. 348, 354 (1957) (objecting to dismissal of the claim, rather than application of domestic law, when foreign law is not adequately proved).
144 See supra pages 337-38.
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no party who tries to rely upon it will be able to satisfy the applicable
standard of proof. Accordingly, any assertions of rights or obligations
that are claimed to derive from the statute will fail.
As well they should. If one applies a best-available-alternative standard, highly ambiguous statutes that give rise to multiple interpretations
are nonetheless given effect, often retroactively against parties who may
have had no reliable way of predicting the finally effective interpretation.
This is not a result to prize. Passing a law is serious business. If one
intends that the law be enforceable, then one must be prepared, in the
extreme case, to shoot people who fail to obey it. Statutes represent the
exercise of enormous power, and while I have no intention here of identifying the circumstances under which that exercise can be justified, 14 5 the
actual exercise should at least be clear. One of the advantages of an absolute standard of proof for legal interpretation, especially a heightened
standard requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is that it forces the
promulgators of legal rules to speak with sufficient clarity so that ordinary people have a fighting chance of knowing what the law means. An
absolute proof rule thus functions much like a system-wide nondelegation doctrine: lawmakers must set forth comprehensible rules, and cannot simply throw carelessly worded enactments to the wind, trusting that
some "best available alternative" will turn up (preferably after the next
election). 146
One last feature of a system that consciously requires proof of propositions of law bears mention. It would clearly require substantial
changes in the treatment of precedent. In our existing system, factual
findings sometimes serve as precedents of sorts, but only in accordance
with the law of repose. That law, encompassing principles of res judicata
and collateral estoppel, is designed to prevent the same party or parties
from relitigating questions that were fully aired in a prior proceeding. As
a result, it is party-based rather than event-based. 147 Even when two
cases involve precisely the same events, findings of fact entered in a case
involving different parties have no precedential effect. 14 8 Unless they are
145 The short answer is, "not very many."
146 It is possible, however, that an absolute proof standard would promote judicial dishonesty.
Assume that a judge wants to rule in favor of A, who clearly loses if the relevant statute means
"white." Assume further that "white" is in fact the best available interpretation given the applicable
admissibility and significance rules. Under a best-available-alternative standard, the judge could of
course simply lie and say that A's interpretation ("black") is better than B's, but that requires the
judge to adopt a specific interpretation of the statute ("this statute means black"), which is then open
to criticism and appellate review. An absolute proof rule, on the other hand, lets the judge rule forA
simply by finding an appropriate touch of gray and assigning the burden of proof to B. Such a
decision is less visible than a finding of "black," and perhaps less subject to reversal. I am indebted
to John Strong for this insight.
147 See generally 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4449

(1981).
148 See id. at 417.
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estopped from doing so, parties are free to try to produce better evidence
sets than were presented in the prior case, without even a mild presumption against them.
When questions of law are involved, however, our present system
attaches great weight to conclusions reached in cases involving entirely
different parties. That practice is difficult to sustain once law and fact are
equated. If propositions of law are epistemologically equivalent to propositions of fact, and must be established in accordance with the same
principles of proof, there is no more reason than with findings of fact to
give preclusive, or even presumptive, effect to findings of law entered in
one case to the claims of different parties in a different case.
Matters, however, are a bit more complicated than that. When
judgment is entered against a party who bears the burden of proof with
respect to relevant question(s) of law simply because that party failed to
meet its burden, and the law finder accordingly never adopts a specific
legal interpretation, the decision clearly provides no general precedent
for other cases. The decision necessarily reflects only a judgment about
the quality of the proof that was available for a particular interpretation
by the party relying on that interpretation14 9 and may have required no
judgment, positive or negative, about the meaning of the relevant legal
rules. Decisions in which entry of judgment requires adoption of a specific legal interpretation, 150 by contrast, could serve as weak precedents.
The law finder in the precedent-setting case must have found that the
chosen interpretation is justified under whatever absolute standard of
proof has been deemed appropriate. That finding, of course, would have
been made in light of the proofs offered by the parties and the evidence
noticed by the judge, and thus may have been made in light of a deficient
evidence set, but at least it necessarily constitutes a definitive conclusion.
A subsequent party must be free to argue that the previous evidence set
so, there is some reason to accept the
was deficient, but if it does not 15do
1
authoritative.
as
decision
prior
Unsurprisingly, this is essentially how our legal system has treated
precedents involving foreign law. The traditional rule has been that conclusions of foreign law, like findings of fact, are not binding precedents.1 52 This makes perfect theoretical sense, since conclusions of
149 The judge may or may not have considered evidence not put forward by the parties; one
cannot tell simply from the fact of the judgment.
150 My discussion here is confined to interpretation of regulatory, statutory, or constitutional
texts. The interpretation of judicial or social texts in the formation of common-law rules is an entirely different enterprise, which would require a separate article to examine. The interpretation of
written private documents, such as wills or contracts, is probably subject to the present analysis, but
it is already governed by, at most, a weak form of precedent.
151 This discussion assumes that the interpretative principles of admissibility and significance remain constant across cases.
152 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 130, at 88; Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 132, at 63; Stern,
supra note 127, at 28-29.
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foreign law, like findings of fact, are conclusions only about the proofs
proferred by the parties or mustered by the court. 153 In recent years,
however, "the traditional rule has been ignored more often than followed," 154 and the reasons are not hard to imagine. The absence (or
weakness) of precedent has the effect of encouraging relitigation of legal
questions, which might reasonably be viewed as a disadvantage. 155 A
stronger system of precedent, while perhaps epistemologically unjustifiable, may conserve resources by reducing the potential rewards from
seeking new legal interpretations in the face of past decisions. Thus,
there may be an argument-how strong I cannot say-for balancing the
conservation of resources against the injustice of punishing parties for the
bad lawyering (or bad luck) of previous parties.
IV.

CONCLUSION

I do not claim to have answered all of the questions posed by this
Essay; in some cases, I have done nothing more than pose them. But at
least some of them are questions worth posing. I look forward to an
ongoing and fruitful dialogue with interested parties, and may the best
available alternative claim no more than its due.

153 See Stem, supra note 127, at 29.
154 Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 132, at 64.
155 See id. at 63-64.

